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INTRODUCTION
There are deep historical roots for virtually any form of privatiza-
tion that now exists.' Even one of the most touted "new big things"-the
public-private partnership-has roots that go back to at least 1819. In
that year the Supreme Court decided McCulloch v. Maryland;2 this case
involved the creation of an institution that was owned twenty percent by
the federal government and eighty percent by private investors.
3
In the nineteenth century, a robust and virtually unregulated market
failed so dismally that many services were eventually taken over by the
government. 4 In other words, what had been private services were "pub-
lic-ized." One reform that resulted from these market failures 5-the
merit system of public employment-was designed to ensure the proper
delivery of public services by protecting public workers from political
influence and thus preventing corruption.
6
Today, strong pressures push in the opposite direction: to move ser-
vices from the public to the private sector. This trend is forcing us to
reexamine the continuing validity of solutions derived from nineteenth
I This article explores only one subset of privatization-subcontracting-and uses the
two words interchangeably.
2 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3 It is interesting to note that in McCulloch, the Court decided that, even though only a
small part of the ownership was federal, the nature of the entity as a whole was federal. See id.
Contrast this with current doctrine related to state action, which requires entrenched govern-
ment control of private actors before state action is found. As a result,
[there is no] constitutional protection against private conduct where the government
has given private actors broad discretion over operation of government pro-
grams.... At the same time, current doctrine applies such protections when they are
often least needed-that is, when governments exercise close supervision and thus
constitutional norms can be enforced by targeting government action directly.
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1371 (2003).
4 Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229-41 (2003); Moshe Adler, The Origins of Governmental Production:
Cleaning the Streets of New York by Contract During the 19th Century (unpublished manu-
script), http://archive.epinet.org/real-media/0101I I1/materials/adler.pdf; see also Moshe Adler,
Why Do We Have Government Employees, Statement Prepared for the General Accounting
Office Commercial Activities Panel (June 11, 2001), http://www.gao.gov/a76panel/adlerl.pdf
(last visited March 14, 2006).
As many government functions as are contracted out are contracted back in. MILDRED
WARNER & AMIR HEiETz, PRIVATIZATION AND THE MARKET ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT:
SMALL GROWTH IN CONTRACTING UNDERSCORES DOMINANCE OF SERVICE PROVISION BY PUB-
LIC EMPLOYEES (DEC. 2001), http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/marketstruct.pdf.
5 Harold W. Demone, Jr., The Political Future of Privatization, in I THE PRIVATIZATION
OF HUMAN SERVICES: POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES 205, 215-16 (Margaret Gibelman & Har-
old W. Demone, Jr., eds. 1998); GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITH-
OUT BUILDING WALLS 176 (1999). (Frug suggests that in addition to problems of corruption,
public city services were provided to promote the integration of immigrants and diverse
populations).
6 See Paul Annee, Policing the 21st Century City, in To MARKET, To MARKET:
REINVENTING INDIANAPOLIS 159, 166-67 (Ingrid Ritchie & Sheila Suess Kennedy eds., 2001).
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and early twentieth century experience. Should some services be exclu-
sively provided by the public sector, or can the private sector reliably
provide them instead? Is regulatory oversight of government actions still
necessary, or can we depend on market forces to provide accountability
and discipline?
I. PRIVATIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The popular view is that the debate on privatization is about cost
and efficiency. This was true at one time when most of the discussion
involved battling theories concerning markets versus social and eco-
nomic justice issues. At the extreme, those who advocated privatization
argued that markets and competition could always be relied upon to pro-
vide the highest quality services at the lowest cost. They preferred letting
individuals decide how best to meet their own needs, rather than ceding
that role to politicians or bureaucrats. 7 Unions and those concerned with
economic and social justice issues often took a "just say no" approach to
contracting out.
Today, it is easier to see that arguments for or against privatization
are actually about accountability. This is not to say that markets, cost,
efficiency, individual liberty, and social and economic justice are issues
absent from today's discussions; rather, it means that they are most often
ways of talking about accountability. Those who prefer markets argue
that markets best provide meaningful accountability. Those concerned
about social and economic justice believe that those values are better
protected by public rather than private methods of accountability.8 That
this was the case has been somewhat obscured by the fact that the battle-
ground over privatization has most often been on turf defined by the
language, thoughts, and values of economics.
Today, our greater experience with privatization has altered the de-
tails of the debate. For example, the possibility of competition has
spurred and, in some places, allowed public sector employees to reexam-
ine how they provide services, make improvements, and demonstrate that
public workers are often able to provide better services at lower cost.
Federal employees won 90% of all competitions conducted under the
regulations in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 in FY-
2004 and FY-2003.9 If, when they are allowed to make improvements
7 Mark H. Moore, Introduction, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1212-13 (2003).
8 Id. at 1212.
9 Contracting Out: IG: DOD Relies on Contractor Support To Conduct Public-Private
Competitions, 43 Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. (BNA) No.2095, at 155 (Feb. 15, 2005) [herein-
after Contracting Out 1]; Rise in Outsourced Government HR Reported; Move Is Driven by
Complex Systems, Aging IT, 42 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2072, at 793 (Aug. 24,
2004).
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and compete, public sector employees have done well, then perhaps com-
petition is a useful prod to delivering high quality services. In addition,
these results suggest that the public sector is not inferior to the private
sector when there is head-to-head competition.
In other words, there are arguably many winners in this process.
The workers feel empowered by having a role in improving their work-
ing conditions. They have a greater sense of pride in their work when
they know they have proven that they provide better, more efficient ser-
vice. The public benefits because it has retained their expertise. As a
result, competition has been a spur to providing the highest quality work
at the lowest cost and it assures us that the government or contractor
workers are providing the highest quality work at lowest possible cost.
However, this idealized scenario is not always achieved. Competi-
tions are expensive in terms of money, disruption, and mistaken con-
tracting. In some cases, work is contracted out without allowing
government workers to compete, often for ideological reasons.' 0 The
concern is that, otherwise, the government should win every competition
because it has a natural advantage in providing a lower-cost service since
it need not make a profit, pays no taxes, and has a lower cost of borrow-
ing. 1 At least at the local level, competitive bidding is not the norm. In
2002, only 26.5% of local government public employees were allowed to
compete for their work, down from 33.3% in 1997.12 Another reason not
to be sanguine about the impact and results of competition is the lack of
experienced, trained personnel to conduct competitive bidding. The De-
partment of Defense has responded to this experience deficit by con-
tracting out the process of contracting out government work.
13
10 The Bush Administration advocates "direct conversions" of government jobs, bypas-
sing competitions. Federal unions contend that direct conversion is "theft, pure and simple, a
way for the administration to reward contractor cronies with sole-source contracts." Melanie I.
Dooley, Contracting Out: Federal Unions Oppose OFPP Plan To Reinstate Direct Job Con-
versions, 43 Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. (BNA) No.2094, at 128 (Feb. 8, 2005); Louis C.
LaBrecque, Contracting Out: NTEU Files Summary Judgment Motion To Stop IRS Mailroom
Job Outsourcing, 42 GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. (BNA) No.2082, at 1053 (Nov. 9, 2004).
11 Prepared Testimony of Gary D. Eugebretson, President, Contract Servs. Ass'n of Am.
Before the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt, Info. & Tech., FED.
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 16, 2000). On the other hand, private contractors may have an advantage if
they are allowed to compete by lowering employee wages and benefits. See Melanie I.
Dooley, Contracting Out: Members of Congress Express Opposition To Health Insurance
Comparability Repeal, 43 Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. (BNA) No.2095, at 155 (Feb. 15,
2005).
12 Mildred Warner & Amir Hefetz, Pragmatism Over Politics: Alternative Service Deliv-
ery in Local Government, 1992-2002, 71 THE MUN. Y.B. 8, 14 (2004).
13 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP'T OF DEF., DEF. INFRASTRUCTURE: DoD
WORKFORCE EMPLOYED TO CONDUCT PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITIONS UNDER THE DoD COM-
PETITIVE SOURCING PROGRAM, REP. No. D-2005-028 (Feb. 1, 2005), http://
www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/FY05/05-028.pdf.; Melanie I. Dooley, Personnel Manage-
ment: Acquisition Workforce Issues Are Root Cause of Procurement System Problems, Aide
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In short, just as in the time of McCulloch v. Maryland,14 govern-
ment services continue to be provided by a range of public and private
suppliers.' 5 A recent survey of local government managers found that
city, county, and township services are provided by a mix of government
(57%), public-private (23%), private for-profit (18%), and private non-
profit (8%) entities.1 6 This result might not have been predicted ten or
twenty years ago because, starting in the early 1980's, enthusiasm for the
market and for private over public provision of services created almost a
presumption that most work would go to private providers.
17
The reality of providing public services has proven to be far more
complex than theory predicted. For example, there may be a lack of
private providers. In 2002, 31% of local governments found that no pri-
vate competitors provided a specific service. 18 Even where there is not a
total absence of potential private providers, there may be too few to cre-
ate the competition that is supposed to provide market discipline. Our
twenty-five year experiment with privatization has provided anecdotal
evidence and data showing that a mixture of private and public provision
of government services is the pattern that has persisted. There is no rea-
son to doubt that this will continue to be the case. The important question
is what forces lead to this result.
Experience has provided us with some answers. First, we continue
to have privatization failures. 19 These failures range from poor perform-
ance to outright misfeasance in privatized services. A recent example is
the Custer Battles contract in Iraq. This contract appears to have led to
Says, 43 Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. (BNA) No.2092, at 73 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter DEF.
INFRASTRUCTURE].
Some contractors who now decide competitions and award contracts are themselves em-
ployed by private contractors. Such contractors may not fully understand the work govern-
ment agencies perform and the requirements involved, resulting in solicitations that put
government workers at a disadvantage. Contracting Out I, supra note 9.
14 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
15 Amir Hefetz & Mildred Warner, Privatization athd Its Reverse: Explaining the Dy-
namics of the Government Contracting Process, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 171, 172
(2004).
16 Warner & Hefetz, Pragmatism Over Politics, supra note 12, at 8.
17 Hefetz & Warner, Privatization and Its Reverse, surpa note 15; Minow, supra note 4,
at 1252-53.
18 Warner & Hefetz, Pragmatism Over Politics, supra note 12, at 13; See generally,
ELLIOTT D. SCLAR, You DON'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF
PRIVATIZATION (The Century Foundation, Inc. 2000).
19 Recently the New York Times provided a shocking look at privatization failures in
privatized medical care in jails and prisons. Paul von Zielbauer, A Spotty Record of Health
Care For Children in City Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2005, at Al; Paul von Zielbauer,
Missed Signals in New York Jails Open Way to Season of Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005,
at Al; Paul von Zielbauer, As Health Care in Jails Goes Private, 10 Days Can Be a Death
Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, § I (Magazine), at 1. See below § A for a discussion of
public service failures.
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unperformed and misperformed work, few or no records or oversight,
billings by shell companies, and fraud.20 About 22% of local govern-
ments reported privatization failures. 2 1 We have also seen evidence that
lack of subcontracting oversight creates a danger of financial and other
losses. 22 At the same time that we know privatization failures exist, we
also know that the lack of oversight means we do not have sufficient data
to measure the extent of the problem. In other words, one consequence of
the enthusiasm for private over public has been a presumption against
exercising oversight or even systematically collecting data.
In the past, privatization successes or failures offered useful infor-
mation for allocating services to the public or private arena. Now, how-
ever, overenthusiasm for privatization that has led to at least some
unwise privatization, coupled with a lack of data to identify where this
has occurred, suggests that we cannot rely that the current placement of a
service as public or private is appropriate. If so, what factors can help us
identify whether a service is better provided as a public or private ser-
vice? History may be a helpful guide to answering this question. In the
past, government has reacted to these failures by creating accountability
mechanisms to guard against both market and agency failures. Therefore,
accountability regulations may shed light on choosing the most appropri-
ate provider.
If this insight is correct, the central issue for privatization is ac-
countability. 23 That is, issues of accountability may subsume all argu-
ments about the merits and wisdom of privatization. What, then, are the
accountability arguments made by proponents and opponents of priva-
20 T. Christian Miller, Under Fire: The Rebuilding ofIraq, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at
Al. For examples, see To MARKET, To MARKET: REINVENTING INDIANAPOLIS (Ingrid Ritchie
& Sheila Suess Kennedy eds., 2001); Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market: Privatizing and
Subcontracting Public Work, 60 MD. L. REV. 249 (2001); Minow, supra note 4, at 1259-60.
The Department of Energy (DOE) pays 80-90 percent of its budget to private contractors
and has a miserable record in terms of oversight and accountability. Joshua Wolf Schenk refers
to this as a surrender of authority to the shadow government. Joshua Wolf Shenk, The Perils
of Privatization, 27 WASH. MONTHLY 16, 17-18 (May 1995).
21 Warner & Hefetz, Pragmatism Over Politics, supra note 12, at 15. Areas in which
services have most commonly moved from the private to the public sector were "commercial
waste collection, public utilities, ambulance service, sanitary inspection, insect and rodent con-
trol, animal shelters, day care facilities, child welfare programs, prisons, tax assessing and
processing, and title records," suggesting market failure. Id. at 9.
22 DOD IG Finds $32 Million Error Critical To Source Decision in A-76 Competition,
41 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2004, at 370 (Apr. 8, 2003) [hereinafter DODIG Finds
$32 Million]; see also OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP'T OF DEF, Infrastructure and
Environment: Public/Private Competition for the Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions (D-2003-056) (Mar. 21, 2003); Walker Rich-
mond, Charter School Accountability: Rhetoric, Results, and Ramifications, 12 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 330, 343-45, 353-55 (2004).
23 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. Ac-r. OFF., PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS LEARNED BY STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, REP. No. 97-48, at 18 (March 1997).
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tization? What do private and public sector methods for ensuring ac-
countability tell us about the allocation of providing services? Does
public accountability have a deeper function than merely ensuring that
value for money is received? If public provision and public accountabil-
ity are part of the fabric of a participatory democracy, what then is the
impact of removing those functions from public provision?
A. ACCOUNTABILITY ARGUMENTS BY PRIVATIZATION PROPONENTS
Privatization proponents see all functions as naturally part of a mar-
ket economy. In their view, to the extent services are performed by the
public sector, government has, in effect, misappropriated them. They see
government as innately prone to failure: "flaws in private markets, sig-
nificant though they may be, pale in comparison to the flaws associated
with public provision or even public oversight of private actors. '24 The
failure of the public sector is commonly defined as an inability to provide
high quality services efficiently and at a reasonable cost, and is attributed
to the government's being hamstrung by regulations. 25 What constitutes
a pernicious regulation is most often not specified, but it seems to in-
clude all regulations, even those designed to prevent cronyism and cor-
ruption in choosing and buying technology, renting space, 26 or
constructing public buildings. 27 Privatization proponents view govern-
ment accountability requirements as no more than costly and unneces-
sary bureaucratic regulations that make it impossible to deliver services
effectively and at a reasonable cost. 28 They argue that private contrac-
tors, freed of red tape, can provide better services at lower cost.
29
With less red tape and bureaucracy, private organiza-
tions are thought to provide incentive structures that
minimize agency costs compared to the public sector.
For example, proponents of privatization argue that it is
easier for private organizations to hire, transfer, promote,
or reward employees; make capital investments; and se-
cure approval for innovations through fewer layers of
24 Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, Privatization and Accountabilty, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1422, 1435-41 (2003).
25 See, e.g., Robert Melia, Private Contracting in Human Services (June 1997), http:I/
www.pioneerinstitute.org/research/whitepapers/wp03full.cfm.
26 Id.
27 REASON PUB. POL'Y INST., PRIVATIZATION 2001: THE 15TH ANNUAL REPORT ON
PRIVATIZATION 24-25 (200 1) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION 2001]. See also William J. Curran,
Privatization and Human Services Contracting: A Legal Review, in 2 THE PRIVATIZATION OF
HUMAN SERVICES: CASE STUDIES IN THE PURCHASE OF SERVICES 183, 192 (Margaret Gibelman
& Harold W. Demone, Jr., eds., 1998).
28 See, e.g., Melia, supra note 25.
29 See, e.g., id.
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management. Thus, for any given task, a private organi-
zation would be expected to outperform a public one.
30
In economic theory, a purely competitive market is one in which the
buyer determines how resources are allocated as a result of purchases,
resulting in goods that are sold as cheaply as possible and at the largest
quantity desired. 3' Privatization proponents argue that we can rely on the
market to provide all necessary oversight and controls in addition to
lower cost and better quality products. 32 If regulations do no more than
decrease efficiency and increase cost, then subcontracting is an attractive
and cost-free means to quickly achieve efficiency.
33
Privatization proponents argue that nearly all state and
local government functions can be privatized. They
maintain that having a government monopoly provide
services leads to high costs, reduced quality, and stagna-
tion (lack of innovation and flexibility). Proponents cite
numerous examples whereby state and local govern-
ments have enjoyed savings after a service has been bid
out to the private sector.
34
Proponents often speak as though private provision of services auto-
matically creates the market classical economic theory relies upon. Rely-
ing on market theory, however, creates challenges for privatization
proponents. For example, there is no market, and there can be no benefits
from a market when a government service is transferred to a sole pro-
vider who faces no competition.35 One can argue that even a sole pro-
30 Darrell A. Fruth, Economic and Institutional Constraints on the Privatization of Gov-
ernment Information Technology Services, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 521, 533 (2000) (citation
omitted).
31 ROBERT HEILBRONER & LESTER THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED: EVERYTHING You
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT How THE ECONOMY WORKS AND WHERE IT'S GOING 196 (rev. ed.,
1994); see also Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 24, at 1447-48.
32 For a summary of theory, see Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 24, at 1447-48.
33 Melia, supra note 25; PRIVATIZATION 2001, supra note 27. See also Curran, supra
note 27.
34 Privatization-Background, MICHIGAN IN BRIEF, Apr. 1, 1998, http://www.michiganin
brief.org/edition06/text/issues/issue-48.htm; See Lisa Vecoli, The Politics of Privatization, 15
HAMLINE J. PUB L. & POL'Y, 243, 246-49 (1994) (surveying the typical rhetoric of each side
of the debate).
35 For examples, see SCLAR, supra note 18, at 87-88.
Privatizing government services is founded on the idea that markets set the proper
price, but when there is no market, as when government provides a service or when
there is a monopoly, the price will be tod high. However, there are a number of
reasons why there may be no private market price. Most fundamentally, there may
be no market to provide the sort of services that government does, because many
government services are public goods. Even where analogous services are provided
privately - the "yellow pages" test - they may not be fully comparable. Ostensi-
bly similar services may in fact be different, because government may have different
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vider faces market discipline resulting from its fear that new entrants
could be induced to enter the market and compete. However, this is a
difficult argument to make, even in theory, and suffers from an unscien-
tific, almost talismanic, view of the market as perfect and fully self-regu-
lating under all circumstances. A major problem privatization proponents
face is moving from a quasi-scholastic exercise in logic to a controlled
test of theory. 36 Some even argue that large monopolistic private contrac-
tors are particularly desirable. Alfred Aman, for example, says: "These
efficiencies are even greater if a private unit, capable of operating in
many jurisdictions at once, can count on minimal, or at least, certain
kinds of uniform regulatory costs throughout the service area. So there is
a pressure for harmonization, and many times market approaches harmo-
nize more easily than complicated regulatory approaches.
'37
In short, privatization proponents argue that contractors, disciplined
by the market, will secure the public's well being. 38 The argument relies
on the belief that there is no need to impose legal accountability on pri-
vate contractors because powerful market pressures will punish them if
they provide substandard services. In fact, they contend, imposing legal
regulations will make it impossible for contractors to provide quality ser-
vices at the lowest prices. Therefore, they argue, requiring any accounta-
bility other than the market is foolish and wasteful.
If it is indeed possible to achieve high quality services at low cost
without traditional accountability this is certainly attractive. But although
the argument hinges on market theory, it fails to account for the nonexis-
tence of conditions critical to the existence of a market. First, market
theory requires the existence of many small buyers and sellers acting
with perfect information and equality of bargaining power. These condi-
tions seldom, if ever, exist in the real world. To the extent that privatiza-
tion proponents argue that lack of competition will have no impact on the
results they promise from private provision, they have no justification
based on market theory. To be valid, any theory must be informed by
empirical evidence. Therefore, privatization proponents must face up to
goals than a private business. When there is no market for the services to be subcon-
tracted, it becomes difficult to feel assured that a proper price has been set.
Dannin, To Market, To Market, supra note 20, at 272 (citations omitted).
36 This problem of over-reliance on theory and failure to use the methods of scientific
research exists throughout economics. MICHAEL D. YATES, NAMING THE SYSTEM: INEQUALITY
AND WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 22-28 (2003); see also THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMEN-
TAL ECONOMICS (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
37 Panel Discussion: The Changing Shape of Government, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319,
1323 (2001) [hereinafter The Changing Shape of Government]. To some degree this tracks
arguments that can be made about the wisdom of federal versus state laws. OSHA, for exam-
pie, was enacted to promote uniform health and safety standards. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 667
(2000).
38 For an example, see Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 24.
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real problems, such as market failures and natural monopolies and not
simply fall back on faith in markets.
However, the reaction by privatization proponents has been to argue
the "market" will nonetheless provide, essentially as a matter of faith.
This is a weakness of ideology not open to self-criticism and improve-
ment based on data. They need evidence supporting their claims under
the conditions that actually exist. Privatization proponents suffer by a
lack of experimentation designed to test the theories. Instead, they are
satisfied with being vague on crucial details of the theory and relying on
idiosyncratic anecdotes rather than rigorous testing. To be credible,
privatization proponents need to account for phenomena, such as persis-
tent evidence that government services are superior to those of private
contractors on both cost and quality. For example, a study of private
versus public collection of tax debt found that the government collectors
were ten times more efficient (based on dollars collected to dollars ex-
pended in collection) and that taxpayers' personal information was more
secure with public collectors. 39 This significant difference in quality and
cost cannot be explained only by the government's cost advantage in not
needing to make a profit.
40
Finally, privatization proponents often use labeling in place of dis-
closure. For example, while we are told that privatization frees the public
from bureaucratic regulations, we are often not told exactly which regu-
lations are considered bureaucratic. Without that detail, regulations such
as those designed to prevent cronyism and corruption might be included
even though they are not universally regarded as expendable. 41 Privatiza-
tion proponents have also argued that attention to due process, by requir-
ing hearings and public access to information, is nothing but "a web of
bureaucratic red tape driven by concerns over process and inputs and not
outcomes. '42 But do they really believe that due process is not a value
fundamental to our system?
B. ACCOUNTABILITY ARGUMENTS BY PRIVATIZATION OPPONENTS
Rather than focusing on theories, privatization opponents tend to
rely on anecdotal evidence and studies that demonstrate the superiority of
public provision of services. For example, they point to persistent
problems of corruption and misfeasance that have plagued private con-
39 IRS, NTEU Trade Arguments at House Hearing on Privatizing Collections of Overdue
Taxes, 41 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2011, at 549 (May 27, 2003).
40 Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market, supra note 20, at 262.
41 Melia, supra note 25; Privatization in Certification, Construction, and Management in
Education, in PRIVATIZATION 2001, supra note 27 at 24-25. See also Curran, supra note 27.
42 Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 24.
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tracting. 43 In addition, rather than making a theoretical challenge to criti-
cisms of public accountability, they tend to provide examples where
public services have been demonstrated to be superior to private
provision.
When privatization opponents talk about the market, they argue that
the market alone cannot provide sufficient oversight and that regulation
is therefore necessary. Representative Christopher Shays pointed to a
General Accounting Office report that cautioned: "any absence of robust
competition, a lack of experience specifying contract results or a failure
to monitor performance, can undermine privatization benefits and dam-
age program quality." In making this argument, privatization opponents
present a view of the market not as an elemental force, but as a socially
constructed institution. As with all social institutions, it is prone to fail-
ure and depends on rules and regulations to operate effectively. Thus,
privatization opponents might agree that it can be more financially ad-
vantageous to operate with no rules other than competition for at least the
short term. In the long term, however, other values, such as process val-
ues, also matter. It is therefore reasonable to trade-off some efficiency in
order to ensure that the process is one that lends legitimacy to and satis-
faction with the outcome. When rephrased this way, the argument is es-
sentially one for democratic values.
45
There has been less discussion by privatization opponents about the
components of accountability and the role each of these components
plays. Potential components of accountability include regulations that are
needed for the system's efficient operation. Others protect against or, at
least minimize, the problem of agency failure. Yet others have indepen-
dent utility in providing process values or in being consonant with the
processes expected of a democracy. Put another way, accountability laws
give the public advance knowledge about decision-making, effective in-
put into the decision-making process, and protections from arbitrary and
unfair actions. These protections are provided through state and federal
43 Examples may be found in To MARKET, To MARKET: REINVENTING INDIANAPOLIS
(Ingrid Ritchie & Sheila Suess Kennedy eds., 2001); Dannin, To Market, To Market, supra
note 20, at 249; see also Demone, supra note 5, at 237 (showing that in 1994, about 70% of
Pentagon contractors were under investigation for major improprieties).
44 Prepared Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays, Chairman, Before the House Gov't
Reform and Oversight Comm. Human Res. Subcomm., FED. NEWS SERV., (Nov. 4, 1997). See
also PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING OPERATIONAL COSTS AND/OR QUAL-
rrY OF SERVICE, U.S. General Accounting Office Rep. No.96-158, at 36-37 (Aug. 1996); Pre-
pared Statement of Mark V. Nadel, Assoc. Dir. Income Sec. Issues, Health, Educ., and Human
Services Div., United States Gen. Accounting Office, Before the House Comm. on Gov't Re-
form and Oversight Subcomm. on Human Res. and Intergovernmental Relations, on Child
Support Enforcement Privatization: Challenges in Ensuring Accountability for Program Re-
sults, FED. NEWS SERV., (Nov. 4, 1997); Dannin, To Market, To Market, supra note 20.
45 Issues of accountability and democratic values are discussed infra Parts I (C )(5) and
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Freedom of Information Acts, Open Meetings Acts, Administrative Pro-
cedure Acts, and civil service regulations. These regulations protect the
public welfare and purse at the point when government is considering
services to be privatized; they ensure that government is accountable on
the individual level; and they protect the public interest in fair treatment
by the government.46 Although there are many such regulations, some
critics conclude they are not sufficiently comprehensive for the problems
created when contracting out public services. For example, Congressman
Albert Wynn (D-Md.) recently tried to address this issue by introducing
the Truthfulness, Responsibility, and Accountability in Contracting Act
(H.R. 3426) to ensure that the public-private competition process is
"fair" and that agencies are held accountable for the results.
47
Experience suggests that managed competition can be seen as a new
form of public accountability. 48 Allowing public sector workers to bid on
or compete for their work has led to improved performance by public
agencies. 49 It can be argued that but for the threat of losing work and
jobs to the private sector, these improvements would not have happened.
Does the public sector need an occasional threat in order to improve, or
are there other means of achieving the same end of providing the best
services at the best cost?50
Managed competition is now a part of the federal government's pro-
cess set out in Circular A-76.51 The Government Accountability Office
describes how managed competition functions at the federal level:
"Under managed competition, a public-sector agency competes with pri-
vate-sector firms to provide public-sector functions or services under a
controlled or managed process. This process clearly defines the steps to
be taken by government employees in preparing their own approach to
46 Matthew Diller, Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and En-
trepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1187 (2000).
47 H.R. 3426, 108th Cong. (2003).
48 Until recently, public sector work was contracted out without allowing the government
workers who were performing the work to bid on their own jobs. The Freedom from Govern-
ment Competition Act, S. Bill 314, introduced in 1997, and S. Bill 1724, introduced in 1996,
required that each agency obtain its goods and services by procurement from "private sources"
and thus virtually mandated contracting out and outsourcing. S. 314 3(a), 105th Cong. (1997);
S. 1724 3(a), 104th Cong. (1996). Problems with-and criticisms of-this method of con-
tracting eventually led to the process of managed competition we see today. For a description
of this history, see Dannin, To Market, To Market, supra note 20, at 297-300. Recently,
Circular A-76 § 6(h)(3), (4), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/aO76.html, in-
cluded union officers and employees within the definitions of those with the right to challenge
the contents of an agency's Commercial Activities Inventory, but it is unclear whether this
will allow full rights to challenge decisions.
49 SCLAR, supra note 18, at 130-50.
50 An example of another type of managed competition used to create a quasi-market is
discussed infra Part I (B).
51 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/Circulars/a076/aO76.html; see also http:/
/www.dla.mil/j-3/a-76/OMBCircularA-76New.html.
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performing an activity. The agency's proposal for providing the service,
which includes a bid proposal for cost-estimation purposes, is useful in
competing directly with private-sector bids. '52 The winner of the com-
petition is the "most efficient organization" and entitled to perform the
work for a specific period.
5 3
C. QUESTIONS ABOUT PRIVATIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
While almost all parties to the discussion say they support accounta-
bility,54 they differ on whether that accountability is best provided by the
market or by regulation. The debate is most often about processes. The
procedural debate has focused on whether accountability is best achieved
or is achievable at all through regulatory or contractual oversight rather
than through unfettered market forces. Substantive issues have been less
visible. They center on the liberty interest provided by a free market and
less government involvement in our lives versus values of citizen partici-
pation in governance, equal protection, and due process.
Within these parameters is a far more nuanced and detailed discus-
sion that should be taking place. That discussion should include the fol-
lowing issues: What do public sector accountability regulations provide
as to the delivery of services? If regulation for accountability is neces-
sary in the public sector, is it also necessary in the private sector? If so,
are precisely the same regulations necessary? Does the sort of accounta-
bility vary based on factors such as the sort of services involved or those
served? That is, are the same or different levels of accountability re-
quired for simple make or buy decisions versus the delivery of services
for critical functions or to disadvantaged or disenfranchised populations?
Could accountability requirements transform the private into the public,
or would business models being advanced, as in the California Perform-
ance Review, 55 make the public and private sector indistinguishable? If
so, is either desirable? Moreover, what are the questions and issues that
can help us in answering these questions?
1. Legitimate and Illegitimate Goals
Are there illegitimate uses of privatization? Most would agree
privatization should not be used as a tool to avoid being subject to the
52 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., TERMS RELATED TO PRIVATIZATION AcnvTIES AND
PROCESSES, GAO/GGD-97-121, 17 (July 1997), http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gg97121.
htm.
53 Id. at 18.
54 For some examples of those who oppose accountability, see infra text accompanying
notes 187-89.
55 http://cpr.ca.gov/.
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law. Yet, a natural result of privatization is the loss of constitutional re-
straints and rights, because they apply only to governmental actors.
56
In other words, the price for increased efficiency may be the re-
moval of many rights we value. Most fundamentally, privatization may
deny or infringe on due process rights. For example, a proposal to permit
child support to be collected by private collection agencies with the
power to "intercept tax refunds, seize bank accounts, and trigger passport
denials" may mean decisions are made without the due process standards
now imposed on decision-making and by denying recourse to those in-
jured by those decisions, unless contractors are held accountable in the
same way as is the government.
57
A judge recently wrote, "contracting out is a troubling way of cir-
cumventing having to deal with federal government employees and their
unions," but case law protects the government's ability to engage in this
practice. 58 Do we want government to avoid complying with collective
bargaining, due process rights, and First Amendment rights protecting
speech, freedom of association, and barriers between church and state, or
to infringe on citizens' privacy rights by contracting with a private com-
pany to manage selected pieces of the civic enterprise? 59 Are we willing
to shed these rights as the quid pro quo for cost savings? 60 Are we com-
fortable with contracting out when it allows government to write itself
56 Constitutional rights only exist where there is state action. See Harold J. Sullivan,
Privatization of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights, 47 PuB. ADMIN.
REV. 461 (1987) for a quick overview of the state action doctrine. See also Steve Hitov & Gill
Deford, The Impact of Privatization on Litigation, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 590 (2002) (dis-
cussing issues involving state action and privatization). Gillian Metzger notes that state action
presumes that few private actors will be given governmental powers. Metzger, supra note 3, at
1370.
There have been some instances in which contractors have been held to government
standards:
That is, privatized groups such as private prisons, for example, often are treated just
as if they are government, and so they are held to the due process and cruel and
unusual punishment norms to which government prisons are held. And they are even
worse off because, according to the Supreme Court, their officials are not entitled to
the immunities that government employed officials would have. So there is that kind
of constraint.
Remarks by Jack M. Beermann at Panel Discussion: Public Oversight of Public/Private Part-
nerships, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357, 1361 (2001) (citing to West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56
(1988) and Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997)).
57 S.1882, 106th Cong. (1999); HR. 467b, 106th Cong. (1999). See also S.685, 107th
Cong. (2001).; H.R. 1471, 107th Cong. (2001).
58 Jones v. United States, Case No. Civ. A.02-10775 (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 2003), http://
www.pubklaw.com/rd/courts/02-10775.pdf.
59 Alex J. Luchenitser, Casting Aside the Constitution: The Trend Toward Government
Funding of Religious Social Service Providers, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 615 (2002); Minow,
supra note 4, at 1267-68.
60 Sheila Suess Kennedy, Accountability: The Achilles Heel, in To MARKET, To MAR-
KET: REINVENTING INDIANAPOLIS 139, 145 (Ingrid Ritchie & Sheila Suess Kennedy eds., 2001)
[hereinafter Accountablity].
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out of the coverage of the laws-in effect, privatizing the legislative
process?
61
Within these concerns are the following questions: first, what is
government versus what is not government, and second, how does priva-
tization blur that line? There is an unexamined assumption that delivery
of a service by a private entity is a business act. Privatization proponents
contend that government must adopt business methods, language, and
goals. So citizens become customers, and governments speak of their
"core competencies. '' 62 There is an assumption that, when a service is
delivered by a private company, all the qualities of market competition
exist. This, and other assumptions about how public agencies operate,
may be or have already been contradicted by credible studies.6
3
Add to this the problem that, when a service is contracted out, the
contractor acts as the agent of government and therefore the terms and
limits of its agency cannot legally exceed the government's power.64 In
addition, the contractor's decisions, even when they are not constrained
by the principal, nonetheless become governmental decisions.
65
AFSCME argues: "Governments cannot contract out their 'accountabil-
ity' and will remain ultimately responsible for a contractor's mistakes.
'66
If the contractor has the ability to impose some degree of liability on the
government, then government has ceded to it discretion over the expen-
diture of government funds 67 and has actually taken on more responsibil-
ity-not shed it.
How we feel about government regulation-red tape or accountabil-
ity-can affect where we would place the burden of proof as to whether
61 Shane Harris, Watching People on Behalf of Uncle Sam, GOV'T EXEcUTIVE, Mar. 16,
2004, at 30; Robert O'Harrow Jr., In Age of Security, Firm Mines Wealth Of Personal Data,
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2005, at A-1.
62 See Gerald H. Goldberg, Address to the California Performance Review Commission
(Aug. 27, 2004), http://cpr.ca.gov/updates/archives/pdf/08 27_2004/GOLDBERGpdf.
63 See, e.g., Hefetz & Warner, supra note 15, at 171; Mildred Warner & Amir Hefetz,
Applying Market Solutions to Pubic Service: An Assessment of Efficiency, Equity, and Voice,
38 URB. AFF. REv. 70 (2002).
64 However, there are certainly examples where this has been done, most recently with
the Department of Homeland Security's use of private contractors to evade laws on collection
of data. See infra text accompanying notes 138-39.
65 See Sullivan, supra note 56, at 462. Indianapolis' experience with privatization dur-
ing the Goldsmith years provides many examples of the liability privatization can impose on
the public, see Kennedy, supra note 60, at 143--44.; see also, Richmond, supra note 22, at
346-47.
66 American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, AFSCME Fact
Sheet-Power Tools for Fighting Privatization: Legislative Approaches to Responsible Con-
tracting 1-2, http://www.afscme.org/private/tools05/htm (revised 2/2005).
67 See Ronald C. Moe, Exploring the Limits of Privatization, 47 PUB. ADMiN. REv. 453,
457 (1987) (quoting Lester Salamon). Cf. Hunt v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 297 F.3d 735 (8th Cir.
2002) (nurses employed by a temporary agency can sue the state prison system where they
were placed for violations of Title VII).
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a regulation is arbitrary and unreasonable or exists for a purpose.
68
Strong privatization advocates presume that government regulation
serves no useful purpose. It is therefore legitimate to avoid them by any
means. But a presumption of government failure means willfully being
blind to how regulation functions. Historical and current experience
shows that regulations were enacted to further values most Americans
support. It may be that a regulation may no longer operate to further that
goal, but reaching that conclusion requires a fair-minded examination.
2. Protecting Vulnerable Populations
A major concern of accountability is the need to protect those who
are the most vulnerable, those without political power who also rely
heavily on government services. Those who oppose regulation contend
that markets are best at protecting vulnerable populations. 69 Privatization
opponents view the matter differently. Professor Elliott Sclar observes:
[W]hen you deal with public decision-making, there is
more than one right answer, but some right answers are
more beneficial for some groups and some right answers
are more beneficial for other groups. So the problem is
we ultimately cannot avoid the politics of that. It is a
large gray area.
As an urban planner, if I said, "We are going to
build a parking lot by the beach to make the beach more
accessible," the people who live in the town say, "Well,
you have now made it less accessible to us."
So really there is no easy answer to that, and you
have to try and put your values out and talk about which
things you are trying to maximize, because, as I said,
both sides have warts and pimples.
70
Critics of privatization are particularly concerned that the impact of
the transformation of the American welfare state has not received ade-
quate attention:
[E]ntrusting the most vulnerable citizens and the most
delicate service tasks to private agencies is not simply a
matter of choice between "making" or "buying" ser-
vices. This might be the case when one considers con-
tracting out for pencils, computer services, or strategic
weapons. But when it comes to purchasing the care and
68 See, e.g., Annee, supra note 6, at 159.
69 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CH. L. REV.
947 (1984).
70 The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 37, at 1349.
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control of drug addicts, the safety and nurturing of chil-
dren, the relief of hunger and the regulation of family
life (through child protective activities) from private
agencies, other values than efficiency are at stake.
71
Among those who might think that contracting out is a good idea in
general are some who would be concerned that certain areas should
nonetheless remain in public control. For example, proposals to contract
out the regulation of drug approval might endanger the public if the pri-
vate agency lacks sufficient scientific knowledge, relevant experience,
and independence of judgment.72 Of course, recent experience with ap-
provals of VIOXX and other drugs shows that agencies may also fail in
their missions.
73
3. Public Servants Versus Employees
Today we see a dramatic transformation of citizen attitudes toward
important symbols of our country. Some refuse to display or honor the
flag. Others are openly hostile to "big government." Whereas once our
public buildings were palaces of democracy, now they are unattractive
structures built on the cheap. These changes reflect the public's loss of
esteem for public institutions and for public servants. These attitudes
color views on the delivery of public services. At the same time, if what I
see in the popular press reflects public opinion, popular admiration for
entrepreneurs and commerce seems high.
These popular sentiments may affect feelings about privatization,
but have little relevance to the issues involved in deciding whether public
services should be provided directly or through private contractors:
First, public employees generally have less incentive to
behave opportunistically than external suppliers, who
can capture profits from cutting corners. Thus, all other
things being equal, governments will need to expend
greater effort monitoring private contractors than their
own employees. Second, since governments do not con-
trol the internal operation of the private firm as they do
in the public sector, they have less information about the
activities for which they are contracting. This lack of in-
formation becomes especially important because agency-
cost economics assumes not only that contracting parties
will have conflicting interests, but also that they will
pursue the interests through guile, such as calculated ef-
71 STEVEN RATHGE3 SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE 11 (1993).
72 Curran, supra note 27, at 185-86.
73 http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/COX2/default.htm.
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forts to mislead and confuse. Accordingly, governments
must again devote more resources to overcome this form
of opportunistic behavior than they would if negotiating
with their employees. Thus, contracting out often may
create more costs, in the form of increased monitoring
and negotiation, than it is likely to save.
74
4. Citizens or Customers?
Governments at all levels are trying to model themselves after the
private sector, as evidenced by the use of "customer" to describe those
whom public agencies serve. 75 The substitution of the term customer for
citizen signifies a radical reworking of the relationship between the peo-
ple and their government. It moves us far from a country that is still
founded on these values: "We the people of the United States, in Order to
form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and se-
cure the blessings of our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion for the United States of America. ' 76 It transforms this relationship
into one in which government becomes essentially a holding company
whose purpose is to funnel money and the delivery of services to custom-
ers. 77 If the public is no more than customers, then government's only
role is to perform quality control, that is, to ensure that value is received
for money spent. On the contrary, when the public is viewed as citizens,
then their relationship to their government is not just about providing
services. It is part of the act of governing and is therefore more complex
and nuanced.
5. Oversight as a Reflection of Democratic Values
What are the appropriate and meaningful levels of monitoring of
and accountability for how services are provided? The level of monitor-
ing needed by a complex organization as well as the full impact of ensur-
ing accountability may not be obvious. 78 For example, the General
74 Fruth, supra note 30, at 533-34.
75 See e.g., THE CAL. PERFORMANCE REV: CREATING THE FIRST 21ST CENTURY GOVERN-
MENT IN AMERICA, http://cpr.ca.gov/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005) [hereinafter THE CAL. PER-
FORMANCE REV]; Richmond, supra note 22, at 352-54; One Stop Reporting: Linking
Employers to Child Support Customer Service, http://www.policy-studies.com/markets/child-
support/elink-sub.asp; Official Nebraska Government Website, http://www.hhs.state.ne.us/
svc/employeroutreach/qa.htm. See discussion infra, part III. See also Sheila Suess Kennedy,
Governing a City: Thirty-Two Years, in To MARKET, To MARKET: REINVENTING INDIANAPOLIS
63, 71 (Ingrid Ritchie & Sheila S. Kennedy eds., 2001); Minow, supra note 4, at 1253-54.
76 U.S. CONST. PMBL.
77 MAiTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOwNSruNG DEMOCRACY: How
AMERICA SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 198-233 (2004).
78 Demone, supra note 5, at 228-29.
2005] PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC-IZATION, AND PUBLIC VALUES 129
Accounting Office has recommended against fully privatizing any ser-
vice, because effective accountability means government must retain
enough in-house competence to monitor or retrieve the work if neces-
sary. 79 The problem is more complex than merely losing work to a com-
petitor. Government is not just an actor in the market. Being unable to
monitor work or retrieve it may mean a loss of functions necessary to the
act of governing.
Another way to look at privatization and its impact on democratic
values is the issue of costs and benefits. It is easier to see accountability
and regulation as a cost, rather than as a benefit, to the public. Regulation
and oversight slow decision-making and narrow the range of options.
However, if government services are provided by a democratic govern-
ment, their delivery should be infused with democratic values, such as
voice, due process, equal protection, inclusiveness, and checks on the
improper exercise of power.80
Proponents of privatization say they are not against accountability;
rather, they differ as to where, when, and how accountability takes place.
In short, accountability in the private sector may not take the same form
as in the public sector but, nonetheless, be wholly sufficient. They want
to use the market to bring efficiency and cost savings to the provision of
government services. The problem, however, is how do we preserve
democratic values? Can and should private contractors be held accounta-
ble through means in addition to the market? Is there true accountability
that differs from the way government is held accountable? If not, and
contractors must be held to the higher standard imposed on government,
how can this be accomplished? Finally, what is the impact of contracting
out on the polity, on citizenship in a democracy, and on membership in a
democratic community?
To answer these questions, we need first to examine the role of gov-
ernment regulation for the delivery of services. Second, if regulation is
valuable in the public sector, is it needed when a service is delivered by a
private agent? Third, if so, are there alternate mechanisms to achieve
desirable results in the private sector?
II. ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF
PUBLIC SERVICES
Accountability may seem to be no more than mere technicalities,
but accountability actually raises issues that go to the heart of citizenship
and democracy. It includes "the power relationships between the par-
ties-public or private-and the kinds of information flows that we, as
79 Id. at 209.
80 Kennedy, Accountablity, supra note 60, at 144-45.
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citizens, need to understand whether our public functions are being car-
ried out in humane and effective ways."'8 1 There are many ways in which
these issues could be explored. Here, they are divided into pre-decision
and post-decision-or impact-accountability. Pre-decision accountabil-
ity includes timely and full access to information that a decision is being
considered, information as to the nature of the decision, and participation
in the decision-making process as an interested party, witness, or deci-
sion-maker. Post-decision-or impact-accountability focuses on the
point at which an adverse result may occur. It includes information about
the quality of a service that has been delivered and the opportunity and
ability to effectively hold the decision-maker accountable.
Accountability has both substantive and procedural elements that
are designed to prevent agency failure. One of the great contributions of
United States law has been elevating fair and open procedures to rights
of constitutional status. Laws that provide public input into decision-
making when policy is set are intended to ensure that government offi-
cials do not abuse their power and that they comply with laws and stan-
dards; to prevent secret government; and to encourage the exercise of
discretion in a rational manner. 82 It is easy to see and value substantive
outcomes; they are more visible, especially when the focus is solely on
cost. In this country, learning to appreciate the value of process is an
important part of a lawyer's and a citizen's education.
Substance and procedure are linked in providing accountability. For
example, public access to decision-making not only provides a basis for
influencing decisions and challenging them after they are made, it also
creates evidence and provides information that can be used in the course
of those processes. Alternatively, consider the poster child for privatiza-
tion: the time-serving government bureaucrat who is protected by civil
service laws. Putting aside whether the stereotype is accurate, protecting
government workers can protect the public welfare by ensuring public
employees are shielded from inappropriate pressure. 83 Public workers are
forbidden from having conflicts of interest with their jobs;84 they may be
fired for conduct that harms the mission of their agency85 but may not be
fired unless the dismissal promotes the efficiency of the service. 86 They
are protected from pressure to support a particular politician or political
81 The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 37, at 1321.
82 Matthew Diller, Going Private-The Future of Social Welfare Policy? 35 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 491, 503 (2002).
83 Annee, supra note 6, at 167. Some laws currently require that certain functions be
performed by employees protected by merit or civil service systems. See, e g., AFSCME Fact
Sheet, supra note 66.
84 Moe, supra note 67, at 456.
85 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
86 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503(a), 7513(a) (1994).
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party. 87 Nondiscrimination provisions, which have historically mandated
that government seek members of disadvantaged groups, 88 have helped
raise the living standards of those groups' members. They have also
made this more a government of the people, whose employees under-
stand the needs of diverse constituents.
A. PRE-DECISION ACCOUNTABILITY
Pre-decision accountability includes rights to information, access,
and influence over governmental decisions. 89 It ensures that someone can
be held accountable and provides accountability by giving access to the
decision-making process.
1. Who is Accountable?
We cannot have accountability unless we know who is to be held
accountable and to whom they are accountable. 90 Knowing the identity
of who makes decisions about public services is linked to the execution
of nondelegation laws that forbid governments from delegating govern-
mental power.9' Gillian Metzger observes that the Constitution's separa-
tion of powers and due process requirements prohibit the government
from delegating certain types of powers to private hands and that private
delegation risks placing government power outside constitutional con-
trols 92 and can ultimately subvert constitutional duties and rights. If it is
impossible to determine who is providing a service, then it is impossible
87 Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508,
7321-7327, 7324(a)(2) (1994).
88 Curran, supra note 27, at 195-196.
89 For those who want more detailed information on each of the laws discussed, many
useful articles and books that discuss laws on public accountability can be found in the cita-
tions in this article.
90 See generally, Richmond, supra note 22, at 344-347.
91 Colorado law demands considering whether privatizing a particular service would
mean the improper delegation of a state function, see CoLo. REV. STAT. §24-50-503(l)(f)(II)
(2004); Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture
of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 859, 861
(Summer 2002); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial
Contract, 45 ARiZ. L. REV. 83, 94-95 (2003). "Delegations of governmental power in general
must function within certain parameters and limitations, embodied in the nondelegation doc-
trine and the Due Process Clause." Id. at 94 (citation omitted). "When a legislature delegates
authority to an administrative agency, the separation of powers doctrine will most likely be
brought to bear on the analysis of the delegation." Id. at 94 n.50 (citation omitted). "Delega-
tions from a state to municipalities can implicate the state constitutional scheme for municipal
charters, a state constitutional 'ripper clause,' which is a state-constitution clause restricting
the relationship between state and municipal governments, found in Pennsylvania, California,
Colorado, Montana, New Jersey, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming" Id. at 95 n.51 (citation
omitted).
92 Metzger, supra note 3, at 1370.
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to know whether nondelegation laws have been violated and constitu-
tional rights are being denied.
More than we may realize, decisions we think of as governmental
are being made by private entities.
Asked by Senator David Pryor (D-Arkansas) if other
government contractors were performing "inherently
governmental functions"-deciding where and how to
spend taxpayer money and exercising judgment on mat-
ters of due process-a GAO report responded with a re-
sounding yes. In just a few agencies it found dozens of
examples.
93
The government agency responsible for specific functions is a mat-
ter of public record. Normally, it is easy to find the names of city council
members and the personnel running public agencies, their office ad-
dresses, phone numbers, and other contact and oversight information.
But government itself can be arranged so as to disguise the identity of
agencies and thus deny public access and thwart accountability. As part
of his privatization and reorganization of Indianapolis, Mayor Goldsmith
renamed departments in such a way as to make their responsibilities un-
clear and engaged in such constant reorganization, that it was difficult to
locate responsibility.94
Contracting out public services allows the contractor to hide behind
a government front. The fact that government is not performing a func-
tion may not be publicized or even easily discovered. For example, what
appears to be a government webpage may actually be controlled and op-
erated by a private contractor. This includes not only static information
pages, but also web pages the public must use to communicate with the
government. 95 Nothing about the page reveals that private information is
being given to anyone but the government. As a result, this leaves the
93 Shenk, supra note 20, at 19.
94 William Blomquist, Organizational Change as a Management Tool: Mayor Gold-
smith's Approach, in To MARKET, To MARKET: REINVENTING INDIANAPOLIS 77, 81-82 (Ingrid
Ritchie & Shelia Suess Kennedy eds., 2001).
95 If you want to register your vehicle on-line in Arizona, you may actually be dealing
with IBM, who "operates the program on its own servers, in exchange for $1 per transaction
and 2 percent revenues." Lisa Snell & Adrian Moore, E-Government, HEARTLAND INST.,
(Nov/Dec 1999), http://heartland.org/archives/ia/novdec99/privatization.htm; see also, Melia,
supra note 25; Ellen Dannin, Privatizing Information and Information Technology-Whose Life
is it Anyway? 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 375, 376 (2004); PSI Link, One Stop
Reporting: Linking Employers to Child Support Customer Service, http://www.policy-stud-
ies.com/markets/child-support/elink sub.ap (n.d.).
To see such a system in action, go to http://www.cortidesignhost.com/maximus/childsup-
port/inks.htm, and play with the links. They will take you to pages that appear to be official
government pages. But are they?
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public with no information about who is providing the services. 96 If a
private contractor revealed the private information it had collected, an
injured member of the public would have limited recourse, as a practical
matter. Not only would the citizen lack the information necessary to
hold that wrongdoer accountable, it would appear that the government
caused the injury.
2. Pre-Decision Accountability Through Procedural Access
Public agencies are subject to a web of laws and constitutional du-
ties that mandate that they give notice and information of contemplated
actions and an opportunity for the public to respond and participate.
97
Government actors must make decisions in ways that do not violate con-
stitutional requirements in the Bill of Rights. This obligation is enforcea-
ble through a § 1983 suit, due process notice and hearing requirements,
federal and state administrative procedure acts requiring notice and com-
ment rule making, and fair procedures plus judicial review of agency
action; 98 federal and state freedom of information acts; 99 and open
records and open meeting or "sunshine" acts. 1°
These laws mean that when government provides a service, the pub-
lic may participate in deciding how the service will be provided and in
evaluating how it was provided by serving on a committee or board, by
testifying at a public hearing, or by providing other evidence to decision-
makers. 10' Testimony also creates a record that can be held up to public
scrutiny once a decision is made, 102 thus establishing a basis for the ef-
fective exercise of substantive rights. Decision-makers who have access
to information such as this may be saved from making costly errors.
While participation may affect the substance of decisions, fostering a
sense of citizen empowerment may be even more important.
96 Cf. Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished De-
mocracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.
J. 1559, 1560 (2001) (describing how the welfare state separates sources responsible for col-
lecting and dispensing information).
97 Diller, Revolution in Welfare Administration, supra note 46, at 1128.
98 See id. State Administrative Procedure Acts (APA) restrain arbitrary, unilateral, or
illegal acts, and give rights to hearings when substantial interests are affected by agency ac-
tion. APA also prohibits adopting vague policies or ones contrary to law or unsupported by
competent evidence. Cindy Huddleston & Valory Greenfield, Privatization of TANF in Flor-
ida: A Cautionary Tale, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 540, 541 (2002); Moe, supra note 67, at
456.
99 See Moe, supra note 67, at 456.
100 Phyllis E. Bernard, Privatization of Rural Public Hospitals: Implications for Access
and Indigent Care, 47 MERCER L. REV. 991, 1019-24 (1996).
101 Privatization proponents denigrate the value of attention to process, such as hearings,
as "a web of bureaucratic red tape driven by concerns over process and inputs and not out-
comes." Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 24, at 1449.
102 See Kennedy, Accountablity, supra note 60, at 142 (citations omitted).
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Despite the advantages access provides by ensuring wise decisions
and government accountability, some states, nonetheless, limit the voices
they will hear regarding decisions to contract out. A study of state stat-
utes found that accountability during contracting out was often expressly
limited.10 3 The statutes limited information that could be considered to
that which favored privatization, 104 limited those who could make deci-
sions about contracting out to proponents of privatization, 10 5 or even
mandated contracting out.
10 6
No one argues for regulation purely for its own sake. Rather, histor-
ically, serious problems with contracting led to regulation. Yet we seem
to have forgotten those lessons today. The federal government, for exam-
ple, has been excluding knowledgeable and interested parties from rais-
ing concerns before services are contracted out or from challenging
decisions. Such federal laws permit and even encourage abuse.
For example, the Defense Department awarded a contract to a pri-
vate contractor based on a $31.8 million calculation error.10 7 The deci-
sion to contract out assumed savings of $1.9 million, when, in fact, it
would have been $29.9 million cheaper for government to have kept the
work in-house. 0 8 There were also inadequate standards in seven of ten
performance requirements that made it impossible to evaluate the con-
tractor's performance and hold it accountable for deficiencies. Ironically,
much of the blame was due to errors by a private consultant. lO9 Accord-
ing to the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) Pres-
ident, Bobby L. Hamage, the "blunder would have been brought to light
sooner if the affected federal employees and their union had been given
the same legal standing already enjoyed by contractors to take their
grievances to the General Accounting Office and the Court of Federal
Claims." 10 Without processes that can be used to bring the error to light,
taxpayers might have continued to be overcharged had it not been for
103 Dannin, To Market, To Market, supra note 20, at 302-07.
104 Id. at 302-03.
105 Id. at 304-05.
106 Id. at 263. Recently, Chris Jahn, president of the Contract Services Association of
America, criticized federal privatization competitions as being defective on the ground that
under those rules, 98% were won by the public sector workers. Jahn said the rules were "a
process to do nothing." Defense Department HASC Agrees to Close Competitive Sourcing
'Loopholes' for Streamlined A-76 Process, 42 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2059, at
465 (May 18, 2004).
107 DOD IG Finds $32 Million, supra note 22. See also OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF
THE DEP'T OF DEF., Infrastructure and Environment: Public/Private Competition for the De-
fense Finance and Accounting Service Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions (D-2003-
056), supra note 22.
108 DOD IG Finds $32 Million, supra note 22.
109 Id; see also DEF. INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 13.
110 DOD IG Finds $32 Million, supra note 22.
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three congressional representatives who applied pressure to re-examine
the contract. 11
Despite this experience, one year later, the same defective process
was still in place, and nothing had been set up to prevent fraud and error.
In this case, the government had planned to contract out security jobs at
an Agricultural Department research center without holding a formal
competition. It finally was persuaded that the law required it to run at
least a streamlined competition. Even then, contracting out was almost
assured, because the government based the existing costs of security on
double the number of security jobs actually used at the facility. This
meant that any contractor's bid would certainly be far lower.1 1 2 Again,
this fraud was uncovered and challenged only because employees and
their union asked Senators to intervene and request an investigation. The
procedures then in Circular A-76 gave federal employees and their un-
ions no regular procedure to challenge the contracting process.
1 13
Some might argue that events in both these cases demonstrate that
unions and workers do not need regulation to ensure that the right deci-
sion is ultimately made. They can, instead, go to a sympathetic represen-
tative or senator whose pressure will expose fraud, incompetence, and
waste. It is unlikely that such a simplistic argument would be made, be-
cause it is obvious that relying on such a haphazard procedure places the
public purse, public welfare, and national security at too great a risk. The
public is much more likely to demand effective processes to prevent and
catch abuse, and only systematic procedures can do this.
I Id. On April 19, the General Accounting Office dismissed five protests involving
decisions to contract out work to the private sector under OMB Circular A-76, on the grounds
that no representative of an in-house competitor can be considered an "interested party" eligi-
ble to protest a decisions to contract out. Michael P. Bruno, Collins Offers Bill Giving Federal
Workers Right to Protest A-76 Actions to GAO, 42 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2060,
at 491 (May 25, 2004).
112 Louis C. LaBrecque, USDA Office of Inspector General Is Auditing Decision to Out-
source Research Site Security, 42 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2056, at 398 (Apr. 27,
2004). On April 19, 2004, the General Accounting Office ruled that unions and individual
federal employees do not have the right to protest agency outsourcing decisions to the GAO. In
re Dan Duefrene, Gov'T Accr. OFF. Case No.B-293590.2 (Apr. 19, 2004); Federal Unions
Dealt Blow as GAO Dismisses A-76 Outsourcing Protests, 42 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
No.2056, at 397 (Apr. 27, 2004).
113 In re Dan Duefrene, supra note 112; Federal Unions Dealt Blow as GAO Dismisses
A-76 Outsourcing Protests, supra note 112. See LaBrecque, supra note 112. The Senate re-
sponded to these problems by passing legislation on June 14, 2004, that gave two Defense
Department officials-the agency tender official (ATO) and the representative chosen by the
affected federal employees, the most efficient organization (MEO)-the right to challenge
agency decisions to contract out work under OMB Circular A-76. The House, however, had no
correlated bill pending. Senate Backs GAO Protest Rights for Feds, Bans DOD Streamlined
A-76 Competitions, 42 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2064, at 595 (June 22, 2004). This
issue has been the subject of discussion but has yet to be adequately resolved.
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Furthermore, having to undo errors is far more costly than not mak-
ing them in the first place. In each of these cases there were costs in-
volved in time spent lobbying members of Congress, who, in turn, had to
spend time making demands on the executive branch to investigate. In
addition to the cost of the investigation, there is a cost to restore the
status quo ante. None of this takes into account the personal toll on em-
ployees who wrongfully lost jobs. In the first case, adequate post-deci-
sion accountability procedures would have caught serious errors. In the
second, the lack of accountability, coupled with the money involved,
may itself have encouraged fraud.
114
Long experience has shown that when temptations to shirk or de-
fraud exist, we need a binding web of laws to ensure accountability. Yet,
despite this painfully acquired knowledge, many are committed to keep-
ing the contracting out process secret and preventing participation, thus
depriving the public of access at the critical moment. "For example, as a
means of fostering competition, the National Association of State Pro-
curement Officials (NASPO) recommends that bids be considered confi-
dential until the bidding period is closed and that all information about
the evaluation of bids and bidders be treated as confidential until an
award is made. Even after opening, disclosure obligations may be quali-
fied by a desire to preserve bidders' proprietary information."
' 1 5
114 On June 2, 2004, Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) offered an amendment to curb the
Defense Department's competitive sourcing initiative by all but eliminating use of the stream-
lined process under Circular A-76. In addition, the amendment would:
require a public-private competition under the revised circular before outsourcing for
any DOD function performed by 10 or more civilian employees, including a most
efficient organization plan; require the private sector to beat the government's bid by
10 percent, or $10 million, whichever is less; prevent contractors from scaling back
or not offering health benefits to become more cost-competitive, so that comparative
savings resulting from "inferior" health benefits would not count toward the cost
difference of the bids; and prohibit DOD from modifying, reworking, updating, or
otherwise changing a function so that it is technically performed by fewer than 10
workers so as to meet streamlined conversion rules.
Kennedy Offers Amendment to Curb DOD Competitive Sourcing, Promote Fed Workers, 42
Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2062, at 541 (June 8, 2004). The amendment does not
include a provision, included in a house bill, that both DOD civilian and contractor employees
should enjoy "comparable treatment" throughout the competition, including access to relevant
data and legal standing before the General Accounting Office and the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims. See id. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Susan Collins (R-Maine)
May 19 introduced legislation that would grant certain federal employees the right to protest
federal agencies' public-private competition results at the General Accounting Office. See
Bruno, supra note 11. Michael Wynne, acting undersecretary of defense, opposed giving
federal employees equal rights with private sector contractors to challenge public-private work
competitions held pursuant to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76. See DOD
Opposes Acquisition Workforce Cuts, Federal Worker Full A-76 Protest Rights, 42 Gov'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2059, at 466 (May 18, 2004).
115 Diller, Revolution in Welfare Administration, supra note 46, at 1200.
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With no access to information, it is impossible to make a successful
challenge and even more impossible to know whether or not a challenge
should be made. If those most knowledgeable, such as the workers
whose work is being contracted out, cannot participate in the process of
decision-making, who else will be motivated and competent to partici-
pate and ensure decisions are not made on faulty information or for bad
motives?
In addition to barring public employee participation, courts have
limited standing to challenge decisions." 16 Standing builds in accounta-
bility by ensuring that those who are involved in lawsuits have a real
interest in the case and will thus prosecute their positions vigorously. A
court may find that the harm a plaintiff alleges is not a legally protected
interest because it is not concrete and particularized or is not actual or
imminent. However, these standing requirements are being used to bar
even interested litigants from bringing genuine lawsuits on matters that
affect the public interest. These rulings have virtually made decisions to
contract unchallengeable.
In Jones v. United States, 11 the court held that four civilian em-
ployees and their union could not challenge the Air Force's decision to
contract out the civil engineering function at Hanscom Air Force Base
because they lacked standing. 18 The court found no standing to chal-
lenge a decision to contract out their own jobs, because the plaintiffs
were not deprived of any constitutionally protected property interest: (1)
government regulations in Circular A-76 and Air Force Pamphlet 26-12
stated that employees had no property rights in their jobs and (2) it was
not certain that the employees would lose their jobs if the work were
contracted out, and unless they did, they could not prove they were
injured.
On April 4, 2003, National Park Service Director Fran Mainella
stated that the National Park Service would have to reduce visitor ser-
vices and make other cutbacks in order to meet the Bush administration's
goals for holding public-private competitions for federal jobs. The jobs
to be contracted out included maintenance and administrative positions
and hundreds of archaeologists, biologists, and historians." 19 Two thou-
116 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) requires that a plaintiff
show standing by demonstrating the plaintiff has suffered an 'injury in fact." An injury in fact
is defined as an invasion of a legally protected interest. This interest must be (1) concrete and
particularized and (2) actual or imminent. The plaintiff must also show a causal connection
between the injury and the complained-of conduct.
117 Jones v. United States, No. 02-10775-NG (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 2003), http:H
www.pubklaw.comrd/courts/02-10775.pdf.
118 Id.; see also Air Force Employees, Union Lack Standing To Contest Del-Jen Contract,
Court Rules, 41 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2003, at 455 (Apr. 29, 2003).
1 19 Park Service May Cut Operations to Fund Outsourcing Plan, Director Says in Memo,
41 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2007, at 447 (Apr. 29, 2003).
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sand jobs were potentially involved, but the workers currently holding
them had no standing to challenge the decision under the reasoning of
Jones v. United States. The decision also might affect Park Service ef-
forts to ethnically diversify its workforce120 and may lessen park visitors'
quality of experience in the absence of the park archaeologists, biolo-
gists, and historians. But under the straitened interpretation given to
standing, neither the incumbent employees, their union, those wanting to
prevent lost workforce diversity, nor past or potential future visitors
would have standing to challenge the decision. Who then can enforce
accountability?
The services being contracted out are often so complex that expert,
motivated input must be included in order to protect the public's inter-
ests. Consider recent plans to privatize the collection of federal taxes. In
early 2003, Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Mark Everson told
the House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee that the IRS
planned to use private collection agencies to collect tax debts. 121 The IRS
employees' union, National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), op-
posed the plan on the ground that it would cost taxpayers more money
than having the work done by IRS employees and would jeopardize the
rights and privacy of thousands of taxpayers. The NTEU cited an IRS
study that had estimated that spending an additional $296 million to hire
more IRS compliance employees to focus on accounts receivable would
result in additional collections of $9.47 billion in known tax debts per
year-a return of $31 for every dollar spent-in comparison with private
contracting collection efforts that would cost $3.25 billion to collect $13
billion-a return of $3 for every dollar spent. 122 In addition, a 1996 pilot
test of private tax debt collection found that contractors had violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and failed to protect the security of
sensitive taxpayer information. 12 3
120 Id.
121 IRS. NTEU Trade Arguments at House Hearing on Privatizing Collections of Overdue
Taxes, supra note 39. On June 17, 2004, the House approved hiring private tax collectors,
despite objections that it would be wiser to allocate adequate money to allow the IRS to hire
tax collectors. House Approves Export Tax Measure Allowing Private Contractor Tax Collec-
tion, 42 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2064, at 597 (June 22, 2004).
122 IRS, NTEU Trade Arguments at House Hearing on Privatizing Collections of Overdue
Taxes, supra note 39, at 550.
123 Id. On March 22, 2005, six former employees of Mellon Financial Services were in-
dicted on charges they had destroyed federal tax returns and payments so that their employer, a
private contractor, would appear to have met its performance deadlines. They first hid, and
then destroyed, the 80,000 unprocessed federal tax returns, documents, and checks worth more
than $1 billion in an attempt to conceal failure to meet an IRS deadline for processing taxpayer
returns, payments, and vouchers. The missing tax returns and payments were discovered when
taxpayers began calling the IRS to find out why their checks had not yet been cashed. NTEU
Says Mellon Case Evidences Problems In Outsourcing Federal Tax Administration, 43 Gov'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2102, at 325 (Apr. 5, 2005).
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These studies identify serious concerns affecting citizen financial
and personal well being. In contrast, a study that was limited only to the
cost of the private contractor's service versus money returned to the trea-
sury would find that the private service could pay for itself. It would,
however, have missed the more important fact that the government col-
lection was far more efficient and could return ten times more money to
the Treasury as compared to the cost of collection. It would also have
overlooked serious misfeasance. If the federal employees and their un-
ions are barred from presenting a fuller version of the facts, an inade-
quate decision that failed to protect the public purse might be made.
Unfortunately, no one may have standing even to introduce this informa-
tion under current law, except a contractor who loses a bid.
124
It should be no surprise that standing and the ability to challenge
contracting decisions are limited. Until recently, government contracted
for more limited sorts of products and services, so scrutiny during the
bidding process could be adequate with only controls against fraud. This
crabbed view of accountability may not be adequate, though, when the
procurement is for more complex services.
Rules governing public procurement are principally di-
rected to protect the integrity of the competitive process.
They have never been designed to solicit public input in
creating the policy. They do not ask to what jobs the
program is leading people, or what the indicators are that
training in these welfare-to-work vendor contracts actu-
ally increases employment levels. Procurement proce-
dures generally fail as a vehicle for public participation
in the development of contract specifications, the selec-
tion of contractors, or the enforcement of contract
terms. 1
25
Increasingly, the quality of accountability may be affected by the
degree to which those who have an interest in challenging contracting
decisions are barred from doing so. Some might argue that there is no
point in eliciting the views of public employees, because they will pre-
dictably be obstructionist. However, Representative John L. Mica (R-
Mellon, the private contractor, has now paid a fine of $18.1 million and its tax processing
center has been closed. Id.
124 Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization, 46
AM. J. COMP. L. 481, 491 (1998). Gillette and Stephan suggest that giving public employees
the right to challenge these decisions is one way to give them rights that approximate WARN
Act rights in the public sector. Id. at 491-92. Recent changes in standing under Circular A-76
are discussed, infra note 126.
125 Remarks by Barbara L. Bezdek at Panel Discussion: Public Oversight of Public/Pri-
vate Partnerships, supra note 56, at 1366-67 (2001); Bezdek, Contractual Welfare, supra note
96.
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Fla), then chairman of the House Government Reform and Oversight
Subcommittee on Civil Service, contended that federal employees should
have the chance to challenge cost-saving claims. 26 Challenging claims
in such a context and forcing claimants to provide good information is a
vital way to protect the public interest. Certainly, no one has greater
knowledge of the details of how work is performed than those who do
that work. The incumbent employees are therefore those best suited to
notice missing or incorrect information.
B. POST-DECISION OR IMPACT ACCOUNTABILITY
Regulations provide many tools for post-decision accountability, but
when it comes to privatization, many of these are lost. As discussed
above, there are virtually no formal processes to challenge decisions to
contract out once made. This void essentially leaves only the market
mechanisms of competition to ensure outcomes once a service is priva-
tized.' 27 Privatization proponents claim that the market's neutral, imper-
sonal forces improve the delivery of public services through "market
forces [that] often compel private firms to act as though governed by
public accountability rules."'
28
This theoretical construct is intriguing and attractive, but in reality
its essential premises often do not exist. For example, a private contrac-
tor may not actually be subject to market discipline in even the most
basic sense. This is most common when a service will be or can only be
provided through a single entity, and most problematic when complex
services are to be provided through that single entity. One solution that
has been pursued is using managed competition to mimic a market.
When San Diego County privatized its welfare-to-work program, it di-
vided the work to be performed among San Diego County, Catholic
Charities, Lockheed Martin, and Maximus. Each was assigned a specific
geographic part of the county, each of which differed in significant ways
from the others.1 29 This design meant that the various players were not
competing with one another, since customers were not selecting from
whom they purchased goods or services. Welfare recipients could not
shop around for the best welfare-to-work service vendor. While it might
be argued that the vendors were aware that their performance would be
measured against their "competitors," this was not real competition. The
126 Unions Say Contracting Out Cuts Services, Saves No Money, 191 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) A9 (Oct. 2, 1997).
127 Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 24, at 1447-48.
128 Id. at 1448.
129 Roland Zullo, In Search of the Silver Lining: The Privatization of Welfare-to-Work
Services in San Diego County (unpublished paper, on file with The Cornell Journal of Law and
Public Policy). See also Roland Zullo, Confronting the Wicked Witch and Exposing the Wiz-
ard: Public-Sector Unions and Privatization Policy, 6 WORKING USA 9, 24-28 (2002).
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populations, geography, and infrastructure of the different regions were
varied enough to render meaningful comparison difficult and expensive.
This also meant that if a vendor was to be disciplined at all, that disci-
pline could only come through imposed oversight and accountability, not
the market. The nature of that oversight depended on the content of the
criteria used, the methods by which they were imposed, and the skill of
the regulators. In short, while the work was being performed in the pri-
vate sector, it was not subject to anything resembling market forces.
The San Diego study also found that, in order to create a substitute
for the market, complex and expensive recordkeeping requirements, es-
sentially feedback loops, had to be created. The study noted:
These are complex services that are difficult to monitor
and therefore create high transaction costs. Attempts so
far at creating a competitive model and monitoring the
work of private vendors has exacerbated the demand for
paperwork, reduced the amount of professional contact
with clients, and eroded the professional status of
caseworkers. Moreover, the contract operations division,
and other departments within the County, are increas-
ingly devoting staff time to negotiate contracts, ensure
contract compliance, dealing with contractor contingen-
cies, processing payments, and so forth. This is driving
up the administrative costs linked to this model.
130
The study also found "significant conversion costs associated with
managed competition, including the upgrade of the County information
system, the loss of skilled employees, organizational start-up and em-
ployee training costs for private vendors," and perverse incentives to dis-
qualify clients for aid. 131
The best evidence was that no data showed that the private vendors
were more cost efficient than the public sector and some data showed
that the private vendors had average higher costs per job placement. The
average ratio of job placements to total clients was higher in the public
sector, and the proportion of job takers in unsubsidized employment was
higher in the public sector. Disqualification of welfare recipients was
significantly higher for private vendors, and most private vendors used
former County employees, thus failing to introduce new expertise to the
130 Roland Zullo, In Search of the Silver Lining, supra note 129.
131 Id. at 14 (explaining that the true costs of the service were not used in assessing the
results of the study, but if they had been, would have included "conversion costs related to the
transfer of assets and personnel, in addition to the transaction costs associated with the contract
operations division, the added paperwork," and other oversight functions that would not have
been necessary under public operation).
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delivery of services. 132 Even more troubling, given these findings, was
the difficulty the investigator had in gaining access to data connected
with the program. San Diego County took more than a year to comply
with data requests. Ensuring accountability is difficult if interested par-
ties cannot "have access to data to allow for competing interpretations of
these policies and full public disclosure."'
133
The experience with the San Diego program was not unique, except
that it received the attention of a skilled and determined researcher. De-
cades into the movement for privatization, basic problems with oversight
and accountability occur at every level. For example, a survey of local
governments found that, in 2002, fewer than half had used systematic
evaluations of private service delivery. In those that did, cost was the
most common criterion (87%), while attention to citizen satisfaction-
the substitute for a market's customers-was only used as a criterion
30% of the time. ' 34 Cost may have been the focus because it is easier and
less expensive to measure than qualitative criteria. However, when cost
is the only focus, it fails to ensure that value has been received for the
money. 135
If accountability matters, we should be concerned that most states
lack any regularized oversight of contracting. 36 Some privatization pro-
ponents acknowledge that "privatization sometimes leads to abuse, but
they argue that improving the contracting process and better monitoring
can eliminate most problems."' 137 But if privatization does not intrinsi-
cally offer market discipline, then what does it offer? One advantage
private contractors have is that they can take actions that laws-a/k/a red
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See Warner & Hefetz, supra note 12, at 15.
135 See OMB Says 17,595 Jobs Studied in FY 2003, Saving $1.1 Billion; Unions Dispute
Figures, 42 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2061, at 517 (June 1, 2004) (explaining that
the Office of Management and Budget concluded that there were savings in FY 2003 of $1.1
billion by estimating that the federal government pays approximately $77,000 per civilian FTE
in salary and benefits, and that the government would save about $12,000 per FTE over the
next three to five years. The cost of the competitions was $5000 per FTE. Unions challenged
these figures on the grounds that they did not fully account for the costs of running competitive
sourcing studies; did not factor in time in-house staff spent working on job competitions; did
not consider the cost of diverting employees from performing their agencies' missions in order
to comply with the privatization mandate; were based on projections and not on experience;
and grossly overestimated the pay for a government FIE, because most federal work being
considered for privatization is performed by lower-paid, blue-collar employees whose average
yearly salary and benefits come to less than $77,000); see also OMB to Provide Competitive
Sourcing Summary, 42 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.2059, at 466 (May 18, 2004) (anec-
dotal reporting on privatization).
136 See Dannin, To Market, To Market, supra note 20, at 254.
137 See Privatization-Background, supra note 34. See also Vecoli, supra note 34, at
246-248 (giving a brief survey of the typical rhetoric on each side of the debate).
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tape-forbid public entities from taking.1 38 For example, the Department
of Homeland Security and three dozen other federal agencies have used
ChoicePoint's services to gather information on private citizens that fed-
eral law bars them from collecting.
139
Privatization provides an escape hatch that has allowed government
agencies to contract out of the law. If we do not want laws enforced, then
we should repeal them and not permit backdoor evasions of law. Are we
less concerned by the harms these laws were meant to prevent just be-
cause they are farmed out to the private sector? If we do not want to
rebalance public versus private interests when services are contracted
out,' 40 we may need to apply laws that were put in place to regulate
government to private contractors. 141 A need for this may already exist in
cases that are far more subtle. For example, a contractor may determine
who will receive what level of tax funded services without having to
follow the due process of law requirements of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments. At the same time, should employees of such agencies dare
publicly to challenge their practices, First Amendment free speech rights
will not protect them from summary dismissal. If due process require-
ments governing eligibility determinations for government-deli/ered ser-
vices appear to produce inefficiencies, lifting them entirely through
reliance on private service delivery may produce unacceptable inequities.
If protections for whistle blowers in the public sector sometimes prove
inadequate, it must be remembered that in the private sector no such
protections exist.'
42
Some might argue that privatization will make public officials more
accountable by making cost and quality more visible through the con-
tracting process. This contention is based on the idea that privatization
requires government to set and reveal performance goals and measure-
ment criteria. However, private contractors advocate for laws that protect
the details of their bids from public disclosure, 43 thus styming oversight
by limiting access to relevant information. Governments have also used
the privatization process to hide costs and quality defects 44 from a pub-
lic who might express displeasure at the next election if it had access to
138 See The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 37, at 1323-24.
139 See Hams, supra note 61. See also O'Harrow Jr., supra note 61. In 2000, the State of
Florida wrongfully disenfranchised 8000 people because ChoicePoint provided false informa-
tion that they were felons. See Harris, supra note 61.
140 See The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 37, at 1330-31.
141 Oddly, Melia says that private companies that contract to perform child support en-
forcement must obey the same rules and federal regulations as the state agencies that have
contracted out the work. Melia, supra note 25.
142 Sullivan, supra note 56, at 466.
143 Diller, Revolution in Welfare Administration, supra note 46, at 1200.
144 Fruth, supra note 30, at 525-26.
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the facts. 145 The problems with contracting out under A-76 procedures
are not limited to those described above.
[in privatization,] government officials lose the ability to
respond to public accountability when they have tied
their hands through contractual agreements. The contract
memorializes an agreement that may be expensive to
break.
Governments also may use the contractor as a
scapegoat to avoid accountability. Even without explic-
itly trying to pass blame, government may appear less
connected with the provision of the service when private
companies dole out government service, because the
public may be less likely to associate the government
with the service. Privatization also poses a danger to ac-
countability by fragmenting the government into an ar-
ray of contracts. Critics have noted if government were
reduced to mere contracts, it would lose its capacity to
learn and adapt. Taken together, these considerations
suggest that increasing accountability should not be con-
sidered a major driver in the privatization field.'
46
In addition to serious problems such as outright fraud, providing
services always entails some element of interpretation and discretion that
may cause the execution to differ from what was intended. 147 For exam-
ple, employees may have idiosyncratic procedures, be more or less effec-
tive, be biased against certain people or groups of people, or even be
incompetent. Staffers can alter the very nature of a service by the manner
in which they dispense or withhold advice, encouragement, or under-
standing of clients' needs. At their extreme, this can create a de facto
denial of service.148 As a result, effective review of the ways in which
services are provided entails ensuring accountability for subtle deviations
and recognizing that a service has not been provided and that, as a result,
there is an adverse impact that requires redress.
149
145 See Kennedy, Accountablity, supra note 60, at 140.
146 Fruth, supra note 30, at 525-26.
147 The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 37, at 1353-54.
148 Bezdek, supra note 96, at 1564-65. In Florida, the private welfare provider made it
difficult for clients to exercise rights because it did not give recipients notice of procedures,
written notice of decisions, or the opportunity to request a hearing to contest decisions. See
Huddleston & Greenfield, supra note 98, at 540-42. See also Nicole B. Casarez, Furthering
the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private
Prison Records, 28 U MICH. J. L. REFORM 249 (1995) (reporting that the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (2000) fails to permit access to documents created and maintained by
private prisons).
149 Cf The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 37, at 1338. The fight to sue a
public entity may not necessarily be as expansive as might be otherwise imagined. Govern-
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Effective oversight is difficult. It has consistently been found to be
the weakest part of contracting out government work. 150 One way to look
at the problem is to say that we have a formalistic dichotomy into private
and public. "[A]dministrative acts and public information laws generally
do not apply to private contractors."' 5-' Under this view, mere labeling
affects whether accountability obligations apply. As a result, when ser-
vices are contracted out, all public regulations are automatically lost. In
general, public sector accountability laws will only apply to the private
sector if a judge finds that there is sufficient entwinement of state and
private functions for there to be state action.
15 2
A more rational way to approach this problem would be to use a
functional distinction. If we are concerned about ensuring that a govern-
ment program provides adequate disease control, that concern is not lost
just because a private contractor provides the service. Yet, as things
stand now, when a service is privatized, we, in effect, lose our concern
about needing to be pessimistic about human behavior and therefore
needing to protect ourselves.
Given that our legal system is built on a formalistic rather than a
functional dichotomy and that laws governing the public sector do not
ments can only be sued when they have waived their sovereign immunity to suit, and lower
bodies of government may not have the power to waive that immunity. See, e.g., Mack v.
Detroit, No. 118468 (Mich. July 31, 2002).
150 See Contract Management: Improving Services Acquisitions: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Tech. and Procurement Policy Comm. on Gov't Reform, GAO-02-179T 1 (2001)
(statement of William T. Woods, Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management).
Both private and public employers have serious problems when they outsource work,
according to a recent study by Deloitte Consulting. Deloitte found that 70% of employers
reported negative experiences with outsourcing. These results were reported by experienced
managers who collectively managed about $50 billion in contracts. Deloitte found problems
that include vendor underperformance, loss of control, greater costs, loss of knowledge, com-
promised security of intellectual property, breaches of confidentiality, hidden costs, govern-
ance issues, vendor employee turnover and training, loss of flexibility, and locked in contracts
that lead to loss of bargaining power. DELOITrE CONSULTING, CALLING A CHANGE IN THE
OUTSOURCING MARKET - NEW STUDY REVEALS OUTSOURCING FALLING FROM FAVOR, http://
www.deloitte.com/dtt/research/0,1015,sid%253D I013%2526cid%253D80376,00.html (last
visited on Oct. 25, 2005).
151 Remarks by Barbara L. Bezdek at Panel Discussion: Public Oversight of Public/Pri-
vate Partnerships, supra note 56, at 1366-67. See also Bezdek, Contractual Welfare, supra
note 96. Access to information, a crucial aspect of accountability, differs materially in the
private and public sectors. The FOIA does not apply to the private sector, so crucial informa-
tion needed to assess a contractor's performance may not exist or be available to those outside
the firm.
152 See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 291,
295, 302 (2001); Diller, Going Private, supra note 82, at 503--04. See also Corr. Servs. Corp.
v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 71-72 (2001) (holding that, under Bivens, there is no right to sue
a private corporation running a prison); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 406, 407,
412-13 (1997) (explaining that, in the case of private prisons, they are not entitled to assert
immunities available to the government.); Remarks by Barbara Bezdek at Panel Discussion:
Public Oversight of Public/Private Partnerships, supra note 125.
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apply once services are contracted out, are there ways to ensure that
privatized programs perform? If this is possible, should it be done? Does
the value of accountability outweigh its costs in the private sector?
III. MECHANISMS TO PROVIDE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
Theoretically, there are several routes that could be used to create
accountability for privatized services. We could impose existing public
sector accountability requirements on private contractors. We could cre-
ate private sector accountability processes that are comparable to those in
the public sector or create altogether new mechanisms specific to the
private sector. Finally, if we conclude that regulating contractors is infea-
sible, additional accountability requirements could be imposed on gov-
ernment to ensure it engages in responsible contracting and oversight, 53
in a sense regulating contractors indirectly.
All these alternatives use public sector accountability methods to
construct private sector accountability. Those methods mean that we
could create private analogues to Administrative Procedure Acts to pro-
vide accountability in decision-making, in adjudicating whether those de-
cisions are valid, and in deciding whether they have been legitimately
applied. We could have private sector Freedom of Information Acts, Ad-
ministrative Procedure Acts, and Open Meetings or Sunshine Acts to
provide information as to operations and as a basis to overturn and re-
dress defective decisions. We could install private sector due process,
equal protection, or other constitutional rights. We would have oversight
when contracting out is being considered and during the life of the con-
tract, rather than today's situation where, when a service moves from the
public to the private sector, recourse become less available or may not
even exist.
While such a transfer of oversight-public-ization--may sound at-
tractive, creating such a system is quite complicated in reality. On the
one hand, there is the technical question of how to create private ana-
logues of public accountability. Even more important: is it in our interest
to make private and public provision indistinguishable? Even those who
support accountability may not agree that this bluffing is wise. In addi-
tion, some will strongly oppose such a move, because "accountability
provides a weak rationale for direct public intervention in markets. The
same merits of private markets also argue against significant oversight of
private providers ... [P]ublic oversight mechanisms ... will be expen-
sive and often either irrelevant or counterproductive." 154 In short, they
153 Cf Bezdek, Contractual Welfare, supra note 96, at 1564-65.
154 Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 24, at 1422, 1423-24.
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argue that it is in our interest to retain different ways of providing soci-
ety's goods and services.
A. MAKING THE PRIVATE MORE LiKE THE PUBLIC?
Everyone agrees that private contractors should be held accounta-
ble, but disagrees as to what that means. For those who put their faith in
the unregulated market and consider all regulation to be red tape, ac-
countability is accomplished when services move from public to private
provision. For those who oppose all privatization, there should be no
contracting out and thus no need to consider making the private sector
accountable for providing public services. For the rest, the form of ac-
countability depends on its purpose. For example, problems of agency
failure differ from the need to support public values. Related to these
questions is whether the level at which government is held accountable is
a desirable level for all or some private contractors? If not, what is the
appropriate level and means, and how do we decide the optimal levels
and means? Finally, are there feasible mechanisms to create that account-
ability in the private sector?
155
There are essentially three ways to create private contractor ac-
countability for a class or individually-legislation, contract, and judicial
interpretation. Either laws or individual contracts could mandate proce-
dures comparable to those in the public sector, such as access to informa-
tion on decisions or performance "through reporting requirements and
various ways in which citizens could petition to have contracts amended
if they do not appear to be working properly."'156 Standing could be cre-
ated or defined, either through legislation, contract, or judicial interpreta-
tion, to include a wider class of potential litigants, including ones with
the staying power, money, and stake in the issues to enhance accounta-
bility. 157 Statutes could incorporate or courts could adopt broader defini-
tions of key terms, for example, "agency" and "agency record," in order
to ensure access to information.158 States could legislate that contractors
be treated as state actors for the application of all or at least some of the
laws that control government action and provide rights of access and
accountability to the public.159 Finally, legislation can directly subject
155 This is a task that Jody Freeman is exploring at length. See Jody Freeman, Extending
Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003).
156 The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 37, at 1354.
157 Procedural tools such as intervention of right and permissive intervention could also
be used to permit some level of access to lawsuits. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
158 See generally Craig Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An
Analysis of Public Access to Private Entities under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21
(1999).
159 See Diller, Going Private, supra note 82, at 504; Matthew Diller, Introduction: Rede-
fining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1307, 1310-11 (2001).
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contractors to public accountability laws. For example, Workforce Flor-
ida was made explicitly subject to Florida's public records and sunshine
laws. 160 Laws can require that any or all regulations that apply to govern-
ment will apply when government functions are privatized.
Another route is for courts or legislatures to expand the application
of existing private sector laws and common law doctrines less directly.
Private service providers could be made accountable through tort or con-
tract remedies; professional licensing and accreditation standards; and
laws controlling corporate governance and not-for-profit organiza-
tions. 161 They could create or expand tort rights for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy in order to give private workers standing and
the backbone to contest actions that harm the public. New laws could be
enacted that are designed to create tort-like or contract-like rights. Rather
than imposing accountability standards by law, legislation could pro-
scribe contracting out unless either contractors agree to be treated as state
actors or agree to the application of designated laws that control govern-
ment action and provide rights of public access and accountability and
sufficient insurance to fully cover injuries.
162
Legislation and contract may be used separately or together to
achieve accountability. To some degree, it is helpful to think of contract
terms in a privatized regime as equivalent to governing law that has
been voluntarily assumed by the parties to apply to a discrete relation-
ship. However, it is impossible to demand that certain contract terms
always be achieved. 163 Therefore, there will be more certainty if those
terms are generated by statutes that impose privatization accountability
as the price of winning the contract.
When listed this way, the ability to impose public standards on pri-
vate contractors seems feasible and even attractive. However, beyond
these broad outlines lie many difficult issues. 64 Is it possible to keep
160 Huddleston & Greenfield, supra note 98, at 544. The Florida sunshine law prohibits
Workforce Florida from issuing binding rules or taking binding actions without a public meet-
ing, requires promptly recorded accessible minutes, and bars actions that would unreasonably
restrict public access. Id. at 544-45.
161 Diller, Going Private, supra note 82, at 504.
162 See Diller, Introduction, supra note 159; See also Diller, Going Private, supra note
83, at 504.
163 See Diller, Introduction, supra note 159.
164 Questions can range far beyond those we think of as coming under the umbrella of
accountability laws: Are private entities that perform public work through subcontracts or as
agents of the government to be treated as private and therefore subject to state taxation and
state incorporation laws if they are also quasi-public because they have been subject to regula-
tions such as those under the Freedom of Information Act or the Administrative Procedures
Act? Moe, supra note 67, at 455-56. State Administrative Procedure Acts restrain arbitrary,
unilateral or illegal acts and give rights to hearings when substantial interests are affected by
agency action. They prohibit adopting vague policies or ones contrary to law or unsupported
by competent evidence. Huddleston & Greenfield, supra note 98.
2005] PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC-IZATION, AND PUBLIC VALUES 149
from freezing outdated terms or standards into contract or law, essen-
tially recreating bureaucracy? If state and federal laws are to be applied
to contractors, does their language make sense? Have laws kept pace
with changes in the way government does business and are the records
created or maintained by contractors accessible?1 65 Must decisions be
made in accord with "open meeting" or "sunshine" acts,166 and, if so,
must corporation law be revised? Will the Federal Privacy Act apply to
proscribe disclosure of confidential information? If public decision-mak-
ing laws are to apply, how will this mesh with corporation doctrines and
with the role of corporate officers? Will corporations be required to ad-
mit the public to their decision-making processes? Must they provide
relevant documents upon a FOIA request, or will these documents only
be produced through discovery after a lawsuit is filed? In short, "are
there opportunities along the way for the public to intervene and express
their views?"1 67 What will be the effect of a double layer of accountabil-
ity on rights and procedure, such as whether a claimant has standing to
prosecute a particular claim? All these issues and more will remain un-
certain until judges have interpreted the laws.
We also need to ask: Is employment to be at will, or will employees
have quasi-civil service and whistleblower protections, Fourth Amend-
ment, and privacy rights?168 Is the contracting agency bound by nondis-
crimination provisions, and thus mandated to seek out members of
disadvantaged groups? 169 Are managers subject to public laws forbid-
ding conflicts of interest, or are they liable under corporation law for acts
that are ultra vires or a breach of fiduciary duty?170 There are fundamen-
tal differences in the purposes of the two sorts of laws and rights. Public
rights that protect public employees often do so in order to protect the
165 Greg Bass & Harry Hammitt, Freedom of Information Act Access to Documents of
Private Contractors Doing the Public's Business, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 607 (2002). In
general, to be accessible, records must be agency records and in the possession of an agency.
Thus, the Smithsonian is not an agency because it did not fit into the FOIA's definition. Id. at
607-08. Some states have defined contractors to be covered by FOIA if it is determined that
they are performing a function the government would have to do in absence of the nongovern-
mental body or if "the outside entity exists solely to perform a function for the benefit of the
governmental body." Some have looked at the source of funding so that an entity that derives
some percentage of its funding from the state or local government may be covered. Id. at 609.
166 Workforce Florida was made explicitly subject to Florida's public records and sun-
shine laws. Huddleston & Greenfield, supra note 98, at 544-45. The Florida sunshine law
prohibits Workforce Florida from issuing binding rules or taking binding actions without a
public meeting, requires promptly recorded accessible minutes, and bars actions that would
unreasonably restrict public access. Id.
167 The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 37, at 1353.
168 Moe, supra note 67, at 456.
169 Curran, supra note 27, at 195-96; see also Puerto Rico Ports Authority Not 'Em-
ployer' of Licensed Harbor Pilots, First Circuit Rules 42 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REp. (BNA)
No.2061, at 524 (June 1, 2004).
170 Moe, supra note 67, at 456.
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public by insulating public workers from improper influence. Corporate
obligations extend to the shareholders. What would happen if obligations
to operate in the public interest conflicted with shareholder rights?
Finally, making changes of this breadth depends on a highly opti-
mistic vision of the power of legal tinkering. While all this is possible,
theoretically speaking, the reality is that no obligations can be created if
a contractor is unwilling to assume them. Therefore, we must ask: Do
governments want to lose willing contractors? Consider also decisions
that are subcontracted which violate the non-delegation doctrine and due
process.171 Accountability procedures alone may be insufficient to fore-
stall these problems. One writer asks: Is government outsourcing avoid-
ing the responsibility to engage in decision-making by "the simple act of
giving [its] troubles to someone else."'172
Current examples are not hard to find, including Califor-
nia's decision to outsource its networks and Penn-
sylvania's intention to outsource its data centers. But top
honors must go to Connecticut, which is attempting to
give all its IT functions to some lucky vendor. While
many states are larger, none had previously stepped up
to outsource everything.
173
Even if accountability is imposed, the undermining of intent in ad-
ministering a service can be subtle and elude notice. Matthew Diller de-
scribes how a goal of reducing welfare rolls by a certain percent may be
implemented in such a way that it defeats the larger intent of moving
people into well-paid employment. The hours offices are open, their lo-
cations, the number of visits that must be made to qualify, and the
amount and nature of paperwork all can make it more difficult to qualify
for welfare. Even more subtly, the length of waiting time once in an
office, the availability and comfort of furniture, and the unavailability of
foreign language interpreters can have a similar effect. 174 These deci-
sions can be devolved to the individual caseworker or clerk level. For
example, they could be rewarded (or not punished) for reducing case
171 See Guttman, supra note 91; see also Dru Stevenson, supra note 91.
172 Gary Swindon, Outsourcing Decision-Making (Mar. 16, 1998), http://www.fcw.com/
civic/articles/1998/CIVIC_031698_22.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
173 Id. In the end, Connecticut chose not to do so, William Welsh, Connecticut's Row-
land Pushes IT Modernization, WASHINGTON TECH. (June 6, 2001), http://www.washington
technology.com/cgi-bin/udt/im.display.printable?client.id=wtdaily-test&story.id= 16654 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2006), but many other state and local governments have. Edward McKenna,
Outsourcing Efforts Gather Steam Among Federal Agencies: States Towns Progress Despite
One Dead, WASHINGTON TECH. (Mar. 20, 2000), http://www.washingtontechnology.com-
news/l4_24/tech features/I 153-2.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
174 Indeed, there are strong financial incentives in welfare reform to cut welfare rolls and
little incentive to examine how that happens. See Diller, Revolution in Welfare Administration,
supra note 46, at 1177-83; Roland Zullo, In Search of the Silver Lining, supra note 129.
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levels, but to do so the workers must provide services in a way that dis-
courages applicants, for example, by actively mishandling cases to deny
eligible applicants. 175 The means for doing this range from overt acts like
misinformation, failure to provide information, and failure to return
phone calls to subtler acts like being rude and condescending. Programs
that tout devolving decision-making are letting governmental decisions
be made at the lowest level possible,1 76 and that makes enforcing ac-
countability more difficult.
B. Do WE WANT TO PUBLIC-IZE THE PRIVATE SECTOR?
Jody Freeman, for one, is engaged by the idea of using privatization
"as a mechanism for expanding government's reach into realms tradi-
tionally thought private."' 177 She asks: Is there any way in which legisla-
tion or contract can overcome the separation of public from private to
ensure accountability? 178 As discussed above, this is a theoretically fasci-
nating exercise. But the theoretical ability to erase or blur the lines be-
tween private and public does not mean we should, and, perhaps, can.
Our society may function best with private and public spheres that oper-
ate with different rules to achieve different ends. Even more important,
the players in this area do not want any blending and will vigorously
oppose it. Given this, the question is not how to make contractors ac-
countable, but, rather, does the issue of accountability help us understand
how a service should be provided.
Understanding the role and challenges of creating accountability
may help us decide between private or public provision. We know we
can provide at least some services publicly and privately, while they re-
main fundamentally different with regard to methods of accountability. If
so, what about providing services is intrinsic to the nature of governance
and citizenship and what is not? Put another way, do we want the differ-
ences between public and private to be lost? If the administration of ser-
vices-whether done by government or private contractors-is policy
making, who should be making those policies, for which services, and
why and how?
More important than the philosophical issues of governance is the
fact that powerful people do not want accountability. Imposing accounta-
bility removes a motive to privatize: relief from or evasion of regulation.
175 Diller, Revolution in Welfare Administration, supra note 46, at 1130-31. David
Shipler describes the complexity of the processes with which welfare recipients must comply
and the opportunities these create for individual arbitrary actions. DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE
WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 228-30 (2004).
176 For examples, see Diller, Revolution in Welfare Administration, supra note 46, at
1120-1131.
177 See Freeman, supra note 155.
178 See id.
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The Bush Administration is demanding "direct conversions"-con-
tracting out jobs without any competition or evidence that a private con-
tractor can better perform the work.'
79
Private contractors are hardly clamoring for oversight and regula-
tion. They may tolerate some oversight, but they are saying that at some
point oversight and accountability will be a deal breaker. They point out
that there is always risk in contracting and say that terms to ensure that
contracted-for services are provided at the cost agreed upon add to that
risk, especially since it is difficult to write precise contracts when human
services are involved. 180 Indeed, some contractors and privatization pro-
ponents are rebelling against oversight. 18 They reject the notion that
they should be bound by contract to make the government or public
whole when the contractor fails to live up to its obligations.
This is a retreat from prior arguments in favor of privatization-that
the contractor and not government would bear full responsibility for fail-
ure. As recently as 1998, an argument for privatization was framed thus:
Perhaps the most attractive feature of performance con-
tracting is that risks don't fall so heavily on government
but are shared more equitably between the agency and
winning vendor. The vendor can be paid if and when the
contracted-for objectives are achieved (e.g., more effi-
cient revenue collections, lower unit service costs). Be-
cause of this, vendors are motivated to work closely with
the agency to develop solutions that most quickly and
feasibly deliver the outputs and outcomes sought. When
both parties pursue the same goal and face risks together,
they can work better together to create success. 182
Starting in about 2001, privatization proponents began to argue that
contractors should be made less responsible for problems with their con-
tractual performance. They contend that contractors are being asked to
assume too much liability for performance problems and even to act as
insurers of success. They say this burden will lead private companies to
forgo opportunities, leading to less competition for projects. 183 Some
179 Dooley, supra note 10.
180 See, e.g., Melia, supra note 25.
181 One aspect of contractors' resistance to oversight is the effort to make bid terms
nondisclosable, see supra text accompanying note 114; restricting information about the bidder
restricts oversight and regulation.
182 Jerry Mechling & Victoria Sweeney, Finding and Funding IT Projects, Part 3: Per-
formance Contracting (1998), http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/taubmancenter/pdfs/reports/entire/
report_1998.pdf.
183 Douglas Herbst & David Mackenzie, Unlimited Irrevocable, Unreasonable Liability:
An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, Privatization 2001, supra note 27, at 16, 17. See also MAX-
IMUS, PRIVATIZATION CoNTRAcrs THAT WORK, 8-15 (2001), http:/lcortidesignhost.com/max-
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privatization proponents express concern over having to provide guaran-
tees or indemnification when problems arise with contracts. For example,
Douglas Herbst, vice-president of CH2M HILL and chair of the National
Council for Public-Private Partnerships, and David Mackenzie, an inter-
national transaction specialist, argue:
It's clear that this trend toward over-the-top guaran-
tees can't continue as is. On future deals, contractors
will negotiate harder, perhaps even walking away from
terms they once accepted. Once this happens, the mar-
ketplace will have to adjust accordingly. The time when
private companies push themselves away from the cli-
ent's table because of unnecessary, excessive, and mean-
ingless guarantee requirements may be near. And they
need to be willing to do just that - if that's what it takes
to deliver the message.
1 84
Maximus, a large contractor, makes similar arguments. A guide to
privatization's pro's and cons on Maximus' website advises agencies not
to make "the mistake of placing a contractor under the same restrictions,
red tape, and bureaucratic constraints of your government agency
"185
Of course, one person's red tape is another's accountability. When
privatization proponents say that there should be no rules to determine
what is permissible and no obligations to abide by contract terms, then
constructing meaningful accountability schemes will be an enormous
battle. Private contractors will not voluntarily take on these obligations.
If any accountability at all-certainly accountability at levels akin to that
binding government-is to be imposed on contractors, the only route will
be by legislation or through activist courts willing to overturn precedent
on state action and standing.
186
imus/childsupport/MAX26_PrivRev5.2.pdf (last visited on Oct. 26, 2005); U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFF., CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: TAKING A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO IMPROVING SERVICE Ac-
QUISITIONS (Statement of William T. Woods, Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Man-
agement), GAO-02-499T 7 (Mar. 7, 2002). Some have suggested using "share-in-savings"
contracting so that contractors fund a project in return for a percentage of savings actually
achieved. U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFF., CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: IMPROVING SERVICE ACQUIsI-
TIONS (Statement of William T. Woods, Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Manage-
ment), GAO-02-179T 5 (Nov. 1, 2001).
184 Herbst & Mackenzie, supra note 183.
185 See Maximus, supra note 183, at 4. Public sector union concerns are mentioned only
as problems that must be dealt with, as opposed to legitimate alternate points of view. See id.
at 6.
186 Imposing accountability obligations through judicial interpretations has its own disad-
vantages. Judicial law making is case-by-case and after-the-fact. As a result, the parties to the
case before the court may have been unable to anticipate the outcome and to protect them-
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Imposing accountability, by legislation or otherwise, is not cost-
free.187 Contracting with government is voluntary, so a government that
wants accountability may find itself with few bidders or agreeing to con-
tract prices that will guarantee profits.188 For companies, as well as citi-
zens, not all costs are monetary. Many contractors may not want to open
their bank accounts to public review. 189 When regulation means prices
rise to a level at which a contractor cannot make a profit and perform the
work for less than government workers can, there is no point in privatiz-
ing. The only exception may be those companies for whom government
work constitutes such a large part of their functions they would collapse
if they no longer took it on.
The complexity and importance of accountability suggest that con-
tracting should not take place in instances in which accountability,
greater than is provided by the market and basic contract terms, is impor-
tant. 190 To look at it another way, it may be important to consider what
selves. Other potential parties will have to draw their own conclusions as to whether the law
will apply to them.
187 Costs related to imposing accountability average nearly 20% of contract costs. Hefetz
& Warner, supra note 15, at 175. Of course, the process of privatization is not without its own
costs. The National Park Service was concerned that complying with federal requirements to
determine which jobs should be contracted out would cost $3,000 for each full-time equivalent
job. To cover this cost, the Park Service estimated that it would have to cut visitor services and
seasonal operations. Another cost was the potential loss of diversity in the workforce. Park
Service May Cut Operations to Fund Outsourcing Plan, Director Says in Memo, supra note
119. Other agencies have raised this concern. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., COMPETI-
TIVE SOURCING: GREATER EMPHASIS is NEEDED ON INCREASING EFFICIENCY AND IMPROVING
PERFORMANCE, GAO-04-367 (Feb. 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04367.pdf
(describing the challenges various federal agencies face in implementing competitive sourcing,
including lack of staff and funding).
188 Daniel Sorid, Colorado Highway "Slowdown" Sparks Debate on Toll Roads, Reuters
(Aug. 11, 2005), available at http://www.rednova.com/news/general/205287/colorado-high-
way.slowdownsparksdebate on toll roads/.
The documents, analysis, and additional details on noncompete agreements may be found
at the blog, unbossed. See, e.g., Shirah, E-470 - A Model Road, According to the Federal
Government, http://www.unbossed.comlindex.php?itemid=324 (Aug. 9, 2005) (establishing a
geographic non-compete zone vital for the success of public-private highway partnerships ac-
cording to a U.S. Department of Transportation Report to Congress on Public-Private Partner-
ships (Dec. 2004), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/pppdec2004/#appd2); Bob in Loveland,
Hidden Costs of Toll Roads, http://www.unbossed.com/index.php?itemid=318 (Aug. 8, 2005);
Shirah, Colorado Toll Roads-Trying to Follow the Money, http://www.unbossed.com/in-
dex.php?itemid=321 (Aug. 9, 2005); Shirah, Toll Roads, Privatization, and Taxes-Connect
the DOTs-Part II, http://www.unbossed.com/index.php?itemid=276 (July 20, 2005); Shirah,
Toll Roads, Privatization, and Taxes-Connect the DOTs-Part I, http://www.unbossed.com/
index.php?itemid=274 (July 19, 2005).
189 See Minow, supra note 4, at 1247.
190 Ronald Moe argues: "The public and private sectors may be alike in the nonessentials,
but it is in the essentials where they differ, and these distinctions cannot be glossed over or
taken lightly." Moe, supra note 67, at 454. Or as David Reimer puts it:
And in the final analysis, all embrace not just the same end but the same means.
Every combatant in the privatization debate believes in a "mixed" system for achiev-
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are the advantages of different sorts of accountability mechanisms in par-
ticular situations. 191
Does privatization lead to the undermining of traditional
controls, in terms of either requirements or methods for
participation in government decisions, because the enti-
ties that were providing government services are now
outside of those regimes? Or, does it actually provide,
for example, an opportunity to increase accountability by
bringing private citizens into government and develop-
ing new methods of delivering services and in other
ways transcending the public/private divide?
192
Problems in achieving access and accountability with a private con-
tractor suggest limiting contracting to tasks that (1) are well-defined, (2)
involve a minimum of discretion, (3) have little chance of affecting the
public welfare, (4) are not critical to the undergirding of our well being,
and (5) involve circumstances where failure would not be devastating. 
193
If this roughly defines the divide, we should not, as we now do, see the
delegation of discretion and broad responsibility to private providers in
public health and welfare programs, public education, government infor-
mation and information technology, and prisons, oddly enough, areas
now seen as prime candidates for privatization.
94
IV. CONTRACTING OUT, ACCOUNTABILITY, CITIZENSHIP,
DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY
Accountability in the process of public provision of services is more
than just a tool to safeguard against corruption and cronyism. It can fos-
ter substantive public input and participation in public life.'195 This vision
of a link between accountability and citizenship stands in stark contrast
with that of those who advocate large-scale privatization. "One marked
ing accountability in which governmental rules create the overarching framework
and government employees enforce the framework, but individuals applying their
private values and preferences exercise huge amounts of discretion. How can this
be? How can those who champion government as administrator favor (whether they
acknowledge it or not) private decision-making? How can the supporters of priva-
tization embrace (whether they know it or not) the need for government control?
David R. Riemer, Government as Administrator vs. Government as Purchaser: Do Rules or
Markets Create Greater Accountability in Serving the Poor?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1715,
1720 (2001).
19t See id. at 1718.
192 The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 37, at 1319.
193 This would be in addition to commonly accepted reasons for public provision-prima-
rily issues of public goods and positive externalities.
194 Dannin, supra note 95, at 382-83; Metzger, supra note 3, at 1369; Hefetz & Warner,
supra note 15, at 182.
195 Diller, Introduction, supra note 159.
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difference from past thinking is that organized business groups now view
governmental activities as potential profit centers."' 196 This has generated
a thriving business promoting privatization through lists of opportuni-
ties, 197 master websites with links to other privatization websites,198 and
websites to promote legislation enabling contracting out. On the other
hand, unions and professional associations that are hostile to the priva-
tization movement also maintain websites that track these initiatives.' 99
This divide in vision as to our relation as citizens to government is
reflected in language. As government services move into the private sec-
tor, the language of governance becomes that of commerce. One county
government decided to eliminate the word "government" from letter-
head, business cards, and cars because the word was seen as "arrogant"
and "off-putting. '200 Indianapolis Mayor Stephen Goldsmith, a well
known supporter of privatization, referred to the citizens he represented
as "customers."'20' In a sense, these linguistic shifts imply that the public
and private sectors are alike in the essentials, and that these essentials are
cost and level of service. 20 2 Sheila Suess Kennedy observes that priva-
tization "ideology rests largely on a view of government as primarily a
provider of services for 'customers' rather than a shared enterprise of
citizens." 20 3 Indeed, empirical evidence shows that privatization impels
the shift in status from citizen to customer by focusing almost solely on
cost.
Under privatization, governments give priority to
efficiency concerns and diminish their attention to voice.
However, consumer citizens do not act as though effi-
196 Michael Glanzer, Union Strategies in Privatizations: Shakespeare-Inspired Alterna-
tives, 64 ALB. L. REv. 437, 453 (2000).
197 See http://www.bidders.com (listing privatization opportunities at the state and local
level) (last visited Sept. 4, 2005); http://www.in.gov/ai/bidwatch/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005);
http://www.privatization.org/database/providerdirectory.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
198 http://www.indygov.org (providing links to other privatization sites) (last visited Sept.
4, 2005).
199 See, e.g., Is Education Wall Street's Next High-Flyer Industry?, PRIVATrATION
ALERT, Winter 1997 (noting that private teaching companies' stock substantially increases
when they get their foot in the public system's door, illustrating that education is a prime target
for the investing industry); http://www.afscme.org/private/index.html (last visited Sept. 4,
2005); Stop Wasting America's Money on Privatization, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisis-
theaflcio/ecouncil/ec08O52003b.cfm (last visited Sept. 4, 2005).
200 Demone, supra note 5, at 224.
201 Kennedy, supra note 75, at 71. See also Minow, supra note 4, at 1254; THE CAL.
PERFORMANCE REV., supra note 75.
202 The City of San Diego has taken an apolitical stance. It has, in practice, tended to keep
services public or to contract back in services once privatized. Yet, it contends: "The Competi-
tion Program operates under the premise that taxpayers are not concerned with who provides a
service; they care about the level and cost of that service." http://www.sannet.gov/competition/
competition.shtml. (on file with author)
203 Kennedy, Accountability, supra note 60, at 140 (citation omitted).
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ciency is the only currency running through their mar-
kets. Preferences based on race, income, and other
factors that undermine diversity also have strong cur-
rency. For providers in private markets, profit considera-
tions can outweigh social values. Thus, privatization
may provide an avenue to increase efficiency, but the
limitations of markets prevent it from adequately ad-
dressing the full range of community and regional
needs. 2
04
The language of the California Performance Review captures this
change in values from citizenship to "customership" when it describes its
goals:
California must pursue a customer-focused transforma-
tion in government operations ... Staff needs to trans-
form the fundamental conception of the interactions
between government departments and members of the
public. Simply put, government needs to treat all mem-
bers of the public as customers of government services
to promote and become a customer-centric culture.
205
Some privatization proponents see contracting out as promoting
democratic values because they equate private enterprise and the free
market with democracy. 206 However, a robust democracy requires that
citizens participate in the act of governance itself, not just in "buying"
services. 207 Customers or consumers of services play only a passive role
by "voting" with their dollars; "consumer voice and citizen voice are not
the same. '20 8 This economic model of a country populated by self-inter-
ested rent seekers who are cynically mistrustful about involvement in
civic life would leave us with no one able to challenge corruption and
bad policies.20
9
204 Warner & Hefetz, Applying Market Solutions to Public Services, supra note 63, at 85.
A failure to listen to citizen voice is a major cause of contracting services back into public
provision. Hefetz & Warner, supra note 15, at 175.
205 Ti-E CAL. PERFORMANCE REV., supra note 75.
206 See, e.g., PRIVATIZATION 2001, supra note 27.
207 Governments "generate a unique political discourse by which the public can judge its
satisfaction with the provision of public goods. Responding to private organizations does not
create the same effect on the public." Fruth, supra note 30, at 535 (summarizing Clayton P.
Gillette, Who Puts the Public in the Public Good?: A Comment on Cass, 71 MARQ. L. REV.
534, 547-48 (1988)).
208 Warner & Hefetz, Applying Market Solutions to Public Services, supra note 63, at 85.
209 Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective
Action, Presidential Address at the American Political Science Association (1997) in 92 Am.
POL. Sci. REv. 1, 3 (1998) (discussing pedagogical approaches in the political science
classroom).
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The linguistic shift from citizen to customer reflects the fact that
privatization on a large scale entails (and is intended to create) a reorder-
ing of society that is about far more than how we provide services. One
of the strongest proponents of privatization says:
Privatization is more a political than an economic act.
Long-term, incrementalist tactics are needed to imple-
ment a privatization strategy, with a research and public
relations effort to press for internal and external support
respectively, tax reforms to encourage it, legislation to
allow it, and strong coalitions of stakeholders-some
newly converted-to support it.210
Privatization as a political act, as a method of reordering society,
often goes unseen amidst a focus on the minutiae employed to debate the
merits of privatization: Does it provide better services at less cost? And if
it does, is this because of market forces, lack of proper accounting for
costs, or lowering pay and removing benefits for workers? Are failures
limited to technical matters of breach of contract, poor oversight, or other
problems? 21
1
Indeed, the debates over cost savings and efficiency
often fail to distinguish between savings that are net effi-
ciency gains and those that represent transfers from one
segment of society to another. In privatizing a state-
owned enterprise or contracting out, for example, costs
may be reduced in part by shedding excess staff or by
cutting wages. If the excess staff members have no other
prospects for employment, their release is not necessa-
rily a savings for society as a whole because the workers
are still not engaged in productive activity; rather the
layoffs may be viewed largely as a transfer from the em-
ployees, who are now not paid, to taxpayers or custom-
ers of the enterprise, who now pay less in subsidies or
prices, respectively.212
In other words, what appear to be purely economic decisions are
actually a social and political reordering that affects the relationship be-
tween citizen and government. "[I]f government is more than a service
210 E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 144 (2000).
211 See, e.g., Margaret Gibelman, Theory, Practice, and Experience in the Purchase of
Services, in 1 THE PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SERVICES: POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES 1,
17-18 (Margaret Gibelman & Harold W. Demone Jr. eds., 1998); see also, e.g., Margaret
Gibelman & Harold W. Demone Jr., 1 THE PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SERVICES: POLICY AND
PRACTICE ISSUES at xii (1998).
212 Jost A. G6MEz-IBAREz & JOHN R. MEYER, GOING PRIVATE: THE INTERNATIONAL Ex-
PERIENCE wrrI TRANSPORT PRIVATIZATION 5 (1993).
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provider, if it is an important generator of social capital ... then efforts
at privatization will be measured against a different set of criteria." 213
Ideology is more than a set of ideas or attitudes: ideology creates social
life.214 For example, all aspects of the provision of public services-
from the decision to take on the service to how it is administered--em-
body policy choices and policy-making that will affect society.215 The
essential political nature of decisions around providing services seems to
be commonly overlooked by focusing on economic issues or the techni-
cal details of provision.
2 16
Contracting out shifts our focus from valuing the process by which
decisions are made to one that focuses on only those churlish and limited
ends that can be measured so that competition can take place. 217 Put in
simple terms, we risk losing sight of the fact that what we can count may
not matter and what matters may not be countable.
Some have found that privatization's dollar democracy leads to a
loss of human democratic participation.
In Indianapolis, the civic leaders who used to play an
important role in our public life, whose motives for par-
ticipation were founded on a sense of duty rather than a
potential for profit, have all but disappeared. There are
many reasons for that phenomenon; but privatization has
been identified as one culprit....
. . . When "discretionists" hire "experts" and es-
chew public participation, the sense of connectedness, of
"ownership" essential to the building of community,
suffers. 21
8
A study of local government contracting found that only one-third
measured citizen satisfaction or monitored citizen complaints. 219 The au-
thors concluded:
213 Kennedy, Accountablity, supra note 60, at 140 (citations omitted).
214 Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production: The Making of
Community Mediation, 22 L. & Soc'y REv. 709, 711 (1988).
215 Cf. Curran, supra note 27, at 189-90 (arguing that the "contract mechanism should be
recognized as clearly a part of policy-making").
216 See, e.g., Gibelman & Demone eds., supra note 211, at xii.
217 Privatization can be seen as the logical conclusion of the new model. In essence,
government cedes tremendous power over how a program will be administered, with
the belief that competition and performance incentives will spur the contractor to
produce the desired outcomes. Privatization becomes an attractive alternative when
ends are viewed as more important than means and where the ends sought can be
specified in advance and measured.
Diller, supra note 46, at 1182.
218 Kennedy, Accountablity, supra note 60, at 142-43 (citations omitted).
219 Hefetz & Warner, supra note 15, at 181; Warner & Hefetz, Applying Market Solutions
to Public Services, supra note 63, at 78-80.
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Privatization ... no longer shows responsiveness to citi-
zen voice. Theoretically, one might expect stronger re-
sponsiveness to citizen voice under privatization.
However, most privatized local government services do
not involve vouchers given directly to a consumer citi-
zen. Rather, they are contracts between government and
private providers. Avenues for citizen voice in contract
negotiation and oversight are limited. Opportunities for
voice may be greatest in the initial contract negotiation
stage.
220
More disturbing, some have found that support for privatization
tracks distrust in government. 22 ' It is hard to know which is the cause
and which the effect. It seems possible that anti-government sentiments
would be exacerbated by the tendency of pro-privatizationists to deni-
grate government, which then results in a loss of enthusiasm for
politics.
222
There is a danger that people will lose contact with their govern-
ment when dealing with an intermediary who often appears in the guise
of government, as when private contractors hide behind what appear to
be government websites. 223 In these cases, people who are misled about
the entity they are dealing with will be affected by a private entity's
commercial values and conflate them with governance. This is likely to
lead to a different interaction than when the services are provided with
those who operate from an ethos of public service, 224 an ethos that is a
part of what distinguishes government from commerce. 225 Furthermore,
when the contractor is a large national corporation, as many are, this
moves decision-making power-and money-away from the local level,
220 Warner & Hefetz, Applying Market Solutions to Public Services, supra note 63, at 83.
221 Demone, supra note 5, at 219-27.
222 Ellen J. Dannin, To Market, To Market: Caveat Emptor, in To MARKET, To MARKET:
REINVENTING INDIANAPOLIS 3, 3-4 143 (Ingrid Ritchie & Sheila Suess Kennedy eds., 2001);
Kennedy, Accountablity, supra note 60, at 143 (citations omitted).
223 On the other hand, one form of quasi-privatization, charter schools, may be a force for
democratic action on a small scale by harnessing "the shared commitment and energies of the
internal actors-administrators, teachers, parents, and students-who choose to become part
of the school and who share a common educational goal." Richmond, supra note 22, at 331,
355-61. The negative side of this is that the goal is accomplished by exiting from and there-
fore losing commitment to the shared goals of a public education system.
224 See Demone, supra note 5, at 219-27. In ALISTER BARRY, SOMEONE ELSE'S COUN-
TRy: THE STORY OF THE NEW RIGHT REVOLUTION IN NEW ZEALAND (Community Media Trust
1996), the last director of the N.Z. Forestry Service before it was corporatized and eventually
privatized discusses his feelings about holding the public's investments in their forests as a
sacred trust. He also comments that he had valued being a public servant and working for an
agency that had the word "service" in its very name.
225 For a summary of ways the two can be distinguished, see Kennedy, Accountablity,
supra note 60, at 149-50.
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creating distance between those who receive services and those who de-
cide how those services will be administered, and leaving them with
fewer revenues to provide them.
Contracting out thus can create a shadow government that is not or
cannot be held accountable by the contracting agency, nor by those it is
supposed to serve. In the first instance, accountability and public input is
lost when the contractor exercises discretion as to how it delivers public
services. Unlike government decision-making, there are no open meet-
ings requirements, no obligation to provide documents upon request, no
procedures imposed to ensure that due process and equal protection
rights are protected, and no ability to change policy through election or
lobbying the legislature.
Privatization, if pursued too aggressively, minimizes the
contacts citizens have with their government. When
functions that were previously handled by government
are contracted out to private companies, fewer commit-
tees and boards are needed. Fewer public hearings are
held, because "experts" rather than citizens are driving
the decision-making processes.... Contracting thus sub-
stantially reduces the points of contact between citizen
and city and with that reduction comes an attenuation of
civic ownership, the sense of shared enterprise that char-
acterizes a workable and working polis.226
Those most likely to lose and to be unable to present their case and
have the ear of the .decisionmakers will be the least powerful. For exam-
ple, if subsidies such as those for public transportation are lost, this will
mean that those who depend on subsidized public transportation will
have suffered a material loss with privatization. 227 While this does not
exactly amount to a taking and does not necessarily implicate due pro-
cess rights, there will be a loss that, perhaps, deserves being taken into
account through some access to the decision-making process. That access
is more difficult to achieve when a private contractor delivers the
services.
Even worse may be distrust and cynicism about a government that
cannot be held accountable. 228 As aggrieved persons seek to hold a con-
tractor accountable, the locus of government will ultimately devolve to
the courts. The courts will have to decide who, if anyone, should be
responsible, in what ways they should be responsible, and what actions
must be taken to make amends when legal responsibilities have not been
226 Id.
227 G6MEz-InA&Ez & MEYER, supra note 212 at 9.
228 Kennedy, Accountablity, supra note 60, at 149.
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met.229 This injects the courts into an area of governance not intended to
be given to them by the division of powers in the Constitution. "Priva-
tization does threaten constitutional rights" 230 Harold Sullivan observes.
If the constitutional restrictions governing the relation-
ship between private service providers and their employ-
ees and clients were the same as those governing the
relationship between government and its employees and
clients, the debate over privatization might logically be
limited to concerns of cost and efficiency and conflicting
views concerning the proper size of government.
231
Think of this another way: If public safety or public security are
reasons not to subcontract a service, we need to understand what exactly
are the components of public safety or public security, that is, what
makes us safe and what makes us secure? Gerald Frug constructs a com-
pelling analysis of city services, not as mere commodities, but, rather, as
one important component of knitting diverse people and communities
together to become one country. 232 Frug argues:
Concerns about the quality of public schools and violent
crime cross city boundary lines throughout America's
metropolitan regions, as do concerns about commuting
and the environmental damage caused by suburban
growth. These concerns have the potential of uniting dif-
ferent kinds of people rather than dividing them if met-
ropolitan residents come to realize that the ever-
increasing centrifugal dynamic that now affects metro-
politan regions throughout the country aggravates urban
problems for a majority of Americans, not just the re-
sidents of central cities. This does not mean that cities
have to abandon totally the consumer-oriented focus
adopted by public goods theorists. But it does meant that
the conception of city services that stresses self-protec-
tion and fragmentation has to be replaced with one that
builds on the notion that the ability to live in a diverse
society is inextricably dependent on the welfare of
others.233
229 Sullivan, supra note 56, at 462.
230 Id. at 461.
231 Id.
232 FRUG, supra note 5, at 167-79.
233 Id. at 175. See also Warner & Hefetz, Applying Market Solutions to Public Services,
supra note 63, at 85 (explaining Frug's argument).
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By commodifying government service-acting as though govern-
ment is no more than a poor relative of business-we may be losing that
which makes us truly safe and secure.

